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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a golden anniversary.  The modern class action rule1 recently 
turned fifty years old.  However, the occasion is marred by troubled times.  
Hate crimes, violence and discrimination on the basis of race, religion, 
gender, immigration status, sexual orientation and more are on the rise.2  
Prejudice that lay dormant has recently erupted, unleashing unbridled 
resentment, fury and even hatred.3  This spike has been particularly acute 
                                                            
*  Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.  Thank you to 
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Modern Class Action” Symposium and to publish with its journal.  I appreciated the synergy of our 
panel so much that I brought us back together at the 2017 Southeastern Association of Law Schools 
(SEALS) Conference, which furthered my thinking on this topic.  I also want to thank the faculty at 
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 1.   Throughout this article, the modern class action rule refers to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, amended in 1966.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
 2.   African-Americans, women, LGBT persons, immigrants and Muslims are being targeted in 
record numbers. The latest FBI annual report—admittedly a conservative estimate because of 
underreporting—reveals a six percent increase in bias-motivated criminal and related offenses.  See 
Latest Hate Crime Statistics Released; Annual Report Sheds Light on Serious Issue, FBI: UCR (Nov. 
14, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2015-hate-crime-statistics-released (“This year’s report, 
which contains data from 14,997 law enforcement agencies, reveals 5,850 criminal incidents and 6,885 
related offenses that were motivated by bias against race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, sexual 
orientation, disability, gender, and gender identity.”); see also Ryan Gabrielson, Ryann Grochowski 
Jones & Eric Sagara, Deadly Force, in Black and White, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:07 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white (citing FBI reports of 1,217 
deadly police shootings from 2010 to 2012 that shows “young black men are 21 times as likely as their 
white peers to be killed by police”); Omar Villafranca, Muslims in U.S. Report Spike in 
Discrimination, Threats, CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/muslims-in-u-s-report-spike-in-discrimination-threats/ (reporting accounts of discrimination 
against Muslims in America). 
 3.   Some project that this trend will continue.  See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HATE & 
EXTREMISM, CAL. STATE UNIV., SAN BERNARDINO, FINAL U.S. STATUS REPORT HATE CRIME 
ANALYSIS & FORECAST FOR 2016/2017 1–3 (2017), https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files 
/Final%20Hate%20Crime%2017%20Status%20Report%20pdf.pdf (forecasting an increase in hate 
crimes for the five largest American cities in 2017). 
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following the presidential election of Donald Trump.4  Official 
government policies and rhetoric have also taken a punitive turn.5  In 
response, activism for racial justice, gender equality and civil and human 
rights has exploded, as exemplified by the Black Lives Matter movement,6 
the National Women’s March7 and the Dreamers initiative,8 among 
                                                            
 4.  See Hate Groups Increase for Second Consecutive Year as Trump Electrifies Radical Right, 
S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/15/hate-groups-
increase-second-consecutive-year-trump-electrifies-radical-right (finding “[t]he most dramatic 
growth was the near-tripling of anti-Muslim hate groups” and “the number of hate groups operating 
in 2016 rose to 917—up from 892 in 2015.  The number is 101 shy of the all-time record set in 2011, 
but high by historic standards.”); see, e.g., Over 200 Incidents of Hateful Harassment and Intimidation 
Since Election Day, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. HATEWATCH (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/ 
hatewatch/2016/11/11/over-200-incidents-hateful-harassment-and-intimidation-election-day 
(reporting nation-wide intimidation and harassment against Blacks, women, LGBT, immigrants and 
Muslims, and noting that “[o]ften times, . . . many incidents, though not all, involved direct references 
to the Trump campaign”); Violence Against the Transgender Community in 2017, HUM. RTS. 
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/violence-against-the-transgender-community-in-2017 (“In 
2016, advocates tracked at least 23 deaths of transgender people in the United States due to fatal 
violence, the most ever recorded.”); Sangay K. Mishra, An Indian Immigrant is Murdered in Kansas. 
It’s Part of a Spike in Hate Crimes Against South Asians, WASH. POST (March 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/07/the-kansas-murder-of-an-
indian-immigrant-is-part-of-a-spike-in-hate-crimes-against-south-asians/?utm_term=.699d6b03953f  
(documenting a 34 percent increase in “hate violence and xenophobic political rhetoric targeting South 
Asian, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Middle Eastern and Arab communities in the year leading up to the 2016 
elections”); Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, Groundbreaking Survey of 50,000+ Young 
People Reveals Troubling Post-Election Spike in Bullying (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://www.hrc.org/press/groundbreaking-survey-of-50000-young-people-reveals-troubling-post-
election (“Seventy percent of respondents reported witnessing bullying, hate messages or harassment 
during or since the 2016 election. Of those, [seventy-nine] percent said such behaviors have been 
occurring more frequently since the onset of the presidential campaign.”). 
 5.  See Juliet Eilperin, Emma Brown, & Darryl Fears, Trump Administration Plans to Minimize 
Civil Rights Efforts in Agencies, WASH. POST (May 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimize-civil-rights-efforts-in-agencies/2017/05/29/ 
922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html?utm_term=.2cbc8e1c9d97; Dona Owens, 100 
Days of Civil Rights in the Trump Administration, NBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2017 9:17 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/president-trumps-first-100-days/100-days-civil-rights-trump-
administration-n752536; Graham Vyse, Donald Trump’s War on Civil Rights Is Intensifying, NEW 
REPUBLIC (May 20, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/142951/donald-trumps-war-civil-rights-
intensifying. 
 6.   See About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, 
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2017); see also Elizabeth Day, 
#BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-civil-rights-movement 
(“Black America is in a state of protest. The 21st-century civil rights movement, exemplified by the 
action taken by Garza and those like her, is democratic in its aims and agile in its responses. It is fueled 
by grief and fury, by righteous rage against injustice and institutionalized racism and by frustration at 
the endemic brutality of the state against those it deems unworthy.”).  
 7.   See WOMEN’S MARCH ON WASHINGTON, https://www.womensmarch.com (last visited Dec. 
11, 2017); Emily Barasch, A Brief History of the Women’s March on Washington, COVETEUR (Feb. 
24, 2017), http://coveteur.com/2017/01/18/brief-history-womens-march-washington/. 
 8.   The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), initiated by the Obama 
Administration, provided temporary protection from deportation and other opportunities to 
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others.9 
There is a peculiar irony in the fact that this modern federal class 
action rule10 marks its golden anniversary within a similarly tumultuous 
environment as its birth.11  The rule itself is rooted in the turbulent history 
of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and was designed to enhance 
civil rights enforcement.12  In response to fierce resistance to 
desegregation following the iconic 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, the rule drafters amended Rule 23 in 1966 to enable structural 
reform and broad remedial relief.13  Since then, this aggregation device has 
played a seminal role in the private enforcement of statutory and 
Constitutional civil rights. 
                                                            
undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as children (i.e., “Dreamers”).  President 
Trump’s recent decision to end the program has result in protests nationwide. Noah Lanard, 
Nationwide Protests Hit the Streets After Trump Decision to End Dreamer Protections, MOTHER 
JONES (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/nationwide-protests-hit-the-
streets-after-trump-decision-to-end-dreamer-protections/. 
 9.   See John Bacon & Alan Gomez, Protests Against Trump’s Immigration Plan Rolling in 
More than 30 Cities, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2017/01/29/homeland-security-judges-stay-has-little-impact-travel-ban/97211720; 
Amber Jamieson, After the Women’s March: Six Mass US Demonstrations to Join this Spring, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/womens-
march-mass-protests-scientists-immigrants-climate-change.  
 10.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  This paper focuses on this specific provision of the 1966 modern 
class action rule. 
 11.   The civil rights movement of the 1960s involved massive non-violent protests and efforts to 
integrate schools, lunch counters, transportation and public accommodations, to acquire voting rights, 
and to economically empower communities.  Freedom riders, activists, and organizers faced church 
bombings, mob violence, and terrorism by the KKK and others.  For a history of the civil rights 
movement, see generally Eyes on the Prize: Awakenings (1954–1956) (PBS Television broadcast 
January 21, 1987); Eyes on the Prize: Fighting Back (1957–1962) (PBS Television broadcast January 
28, 1987); HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S (1991) (companion book to Eyes on the 
Prize). 
 12.   See infra Part IB.  See also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, 
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
286, 315 (2013) (Rule 23’s 1966 revision meant to “provide a useful procedural vehicle, particularly 
for civil rights”); Arthur R. Miller, Some Very Personal Reflections on the Rules, Rulemaking, and 
Reporters, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 651, 652–53 (2013); see also generally Robert G. Bone, Walking 
the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1097, 1102–
06 (2013) (describing the history of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23). 
 13.   Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: 
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 695–
700 (2011) [hereinafter Marcus, Flawed but Noble]; see also RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 25, 25–26 (2008) (“[Brown] radicalized southern whites 
to resist (sometimes violently) the changes the Supreme Court’s decision set in motion.”); id. at 31 
(describing “white opposition to such desegregation [as] passionate and unyielding”); id. at 26–27 
(describing how civil rights lawyers challenged 75 year old “racial and economic caste system” and 
how “violence and legal chicanery” in the south “made it possible to inscribe Jim Crow into legal and 
political structures for generations”). 
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The rule’s rich history makes clear that the drafters infused this 
procedural mechanism with the capacity of being used to challenge racial 
inequality and subordination.14  A half-century since its inception, Rule 
23(b)(2) remains unchanged.  And, like at the modern rule’s birth, 
America’s civil rights climate is in turmoil.  The unmasked vitriol and 
prejudice against religious, ethnic and racial minorities, among others, and 
the rebirth of activism to counteract this trend harkens back to the nadir of 
the modern class action rule.15  The time is ripe, therefore, to determine 
whether this critical aggregation device is functioning as intended. 
This article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the historical 
background of the modern class action rule in relation to civil rights.  More 
specifically, this Part reveals how the drafters deliberately crafted the rule 
to address desegregation obstructionism.  Part II analyzes Supreme Court 
jurisprudence interpreting Rule 23(b)(2) over the course of the last fifty 
years, identifying three primary periods in which the pendulum has swung: 
from a heyday of liberal class certification for broad injunctive relief for 
newly created rights; to a heightened critique and retraction of class 
certification; to a complex gauntlet of contemporary barriers involving 
evidentiary hurdles, contractual restrictions and access limitations.  Part 
III critiques modern class action jurisprudence and concludes that it fails 
to sufficiently fulfill the drafters’ intent of creating an efficient and just 
procedural mechanism for pursuing systemic racial equality.  The Article 
recommends a contemporary judicial interpretation more anchored to the 
bone, rooted in Rule 23(b)(2)’s strong civil rights mission. 
II. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION RULE’S HISTORICAL GROUNDING IN 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
A. The Pre-Cursor to the Modern Class Action Rule—An Equitable 
Tool for Civil Rights Enforcement 
The American class action rule was born in 1938 with the goal of 
promoting equity and access.16  Indeed, from 1938 to 1966, the rule 
                                                            
 14.   See infra Part II.  Unsurprisingly, the drafters primary target at the time was segregation, 
whose pernicious existence long post-dated Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 15.   See John Wagner & Scott Clement, ‘It’s Just Messed Up’: Most Think Political Divisions 
as Bad as Vietnam Era, New Poll Shows, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/democracy-poll/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.f8 
6cfde801fa (“Seven in 10 Americans say the nation’s political divisions are at least as big as during 
the Vietnam War”). 
 16.   7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1752, at 18 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
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provided, inter alia, a mechanism for those fighting racial oppression to 
act collectively.  Following the 1954 seminal Brown v. Board of Education 
decision—holding segregated public schools unconstitutional—the 
aggregation rule was tapped for stemming systemic discrimination and 
segregation in various areas including employment, education, public 
accommodations and housing.17 
The aggregation rule, however, required litigants to shoehorn their 
case into one of three jural relations: “true,” “hybrid” or “spurious.”  In a 
nutshell: “true” classes involved joint or common rights; “hybrid” classes 
involved several rights concerning a claim over a specific property; and 
“spurious” classes involved several rights, with only a common question 
and common relief justifying aggregation.18  Numerosity19 and adequacy 
of representation20—principles required from the rule’s inception21—were 
often satisfied for “race relations” civil rights cases from the late 1930s to 
1960s.22  Within this three-tiered structure, civil rights cases were housed 
in the “true” and “spurious” classes.  For example, union members could 
challenge racial discrimination in a collective bargaining agreement as a 
“true” class because of their joint or common rights.23  By contrast, 
individual litigants challenging segregated facilities as unconstitutional 
often constituted a “spurious” class because of their “several” rights.24 
Prior to 1966, most civil rights cases were technically classified as 
“spurious.”25  Although class members sought “common relief,” and 
shared a “common question of law or fact,” each class member was the 
sole owner of his or her rights.26  Thus, in spurious suits, res judicata was 
                                                            
 17.   Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 22–25 
& nn.31–34 (listing cases). 
 18.   7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752 at 18, 21, 28–31.  These three classifications were set 
forth in then-Rule 23(a).  “True” class actions also included a “secondary” right: i.e. “secondary in the 
sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby 
becomes entitled to enforce it.”  Id. § 1752, at 21–22. 
 19.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (current) (“the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable”). 
 20.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (current) (“the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class”). 
 21.   7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 20. 
 22.   See John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 
2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
CIVIL RULE 23 260, 266 (Rules Committee Support Office, 1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/workingpapers-vol2.pdf. 
 23.   7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 22–23 & n.23 (citing cases). 
 24.   Id. § 1752, at 21–25 (noting connection between Rule 23(b)(2) class actions and the prior 
“spurious” actions, “particularly those involving civil rights” and citing cases). 
 25.   Frank, supra note 22, at 672. 
 26.   These were requirements of spurious classes.  7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 30–
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available only for the named plaintiffs and class members who 
intervened.27  The nature of the rights pursued meant that such cases could 
be denied certification altogether or limited to only the parties involved.28 
Many, perhaps most, judges certified desegregation cases regardless 
of the several rights at issue.29  While recognizing that individuals had their 
constitutional rights violated and were entitled to pursue their individual 
claims, many judges recognized race discrimination as inherently group-
oriented and thus suited for class treatment.30  Moreover, many judges who 
certified civil rights cases as “spurious” classes did not worry about the 
limited res judicata implication of the label, concluding that injunctive 
relief curtailing racially discriminatory policies and laws would eventually 
apply more broadly even to non-parties.31 
However, this approach was hardly uniform.  The rule’s malleability 
gave judges who opposed integration a sword with which to castrate 
Brown.  Judges could, and did, as easily refuse to certify a class of African-
Americans challenging the constitutionality of segregation policies, on the 
grounds that such rights belonged to the individual.32  For those cases that 
were certified as “spurious” class actions, many judges applied 
desegregation orders only to the plaintiffs and against the particular 
defendant institutions before them.33  This conception of the spurious 
class’s utility led some commentators to conclude: “If this is really all the 
‘spurious’ class suit did, then there was very little justification for its 
existence.”34 
                                                            
31.  They justified this type of class action because of the efficiency they offered.  7A WRIGHT, supra 
note 16, § 1752, at 30. 
 27.   Frank, supra note 22, at 673. 
 28.   See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 601 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, History of the Modern Class 
Action]; 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 30–31. 
 29.   Indeed, Committee Member Benjamin Kaplan noted “the very desegregation suits that are 
now [in 1963] being conducted are theoretically spurious class actions, but there isn’t a judge in the 
world that’s treating them that way, nor should they be treated that way.”  Transcript of Sessions on 
Class Actions—EE, Civil Rules Meeting Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935–1988 [hereinafter 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE], microformed on CIS No. CI-7104, 24, 41 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.); see also 7AA WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1776, at 81–83 (“Prior to the 1966 amendment of Rule 
23 most federal courts recognized that class actions were an appropriate means to vindicate an alleged 
denial of civil rights.  Thus, although there was no specific provision in original Rule 23 comparable 
to present subdivision (b)(2), class actions were maintained challenging discrimination in 
employment, education, the use of public facilities, and housing.”). 
 30.   7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 26. 
 31.   Id. at 28. 
 32.   Id. at 23–26. 
 33.   See id. at 31. 
 34.   See id. at 31–32 (summarizing Second Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark’s perception of the 
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Thus, in revamping the class action rule in 1966, the drafters 
eliminated the “true,” “hybrid” and “spurious” classifications, which 
conditioned the scope of the judgment’s preclusive effect on the nature of 
rights pursued.35  These classifications proved unworkable, with many 
judges finding them confusing, applying them inconsistently or 
concluding that they were ultimately immaterial.36  The drafters moved 
away from jural relations, and crafted three different types of class actions 
unrelated to the former.37  The modern class action rule, revised in 1966, 
sets forth the three classes: 
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if Rule 
23(a) is satisfied and if: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class 
members would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual class members that would establish incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, 
as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the 
other members not parties to the individual adjudications or 
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect 
their interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 
the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. . . .38 
To accomplish their goal of designing an aggregation rule that would 
empower those fighting for racial equality, the rule makers specifically 
                                                            
spurious class action as an invitation to others to join the litigation and warning to the judge to be 
mindful of the relief ordered because of its potential precedential effect on non-parties). 
 35.   Id. at 21. 
 36.   Id. at 21–26. 
 37.   See id. at 21 (noting a “rough correspondence” but concluding that “the old categories do 
not and were not intended to coincide with the new”). 
 38.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
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drafted Rule 23(b)(2),39 permitting a class action to be maintained when a 
defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to a group, justifying 
group-wide injunctive or declaratory relief.40  The Committee noted 
“[i]llustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is 
charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose 
members are incapable of specific enumeration.”41  Although Rule 
23(b)(2) is not limited to civil rights cases, its driving force and evolution 
stem from a commitment to systemic desegregation and racial equality.42 
The (b)(2) designation eliminated a distinction some courts would 
make to justify prohibiting class treatment for civil rights cases.43  For 
example, in the Fifth Circuit, one judge granted class certification in a case 
where a registrar outright refused to deal with any African-Americans who 
wanted to register to vote.44  Another judge in the Fifth Circuit, however, 
denied class certification in a case where a registrar individually struck 
African-American voters from the rolls because of their race.45  Because 
the former challenged a policy discriminatory against a group on its face 
and the latter challenged the discriminatory application of a neutral policy 
to various individuals, different class treatment was justified.46  Rule 
23(b)(2) makes this distinction irrelevant. 
The (b)(2) provision provides court access to litigants who could not 
effectively seek injunctive relief on their own.47  As a tool of equity, the 
class action device cleared a way for individuals to wield more power to 
                                                            
 39.   7AA WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1776, at 83 (“[S]ubdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 
1966 in part to make it clear that civil-rights suits for injunctive or declaratory relief can be brought 
as class actions.”); Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining 
Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997) (“The partnership between class actions and civil rights 
has grown to such an extent that the Advisory Committee revising Rule 23 noted that, ‘subdivision 
(b)(2) has cemented the role of class actions in enforcing a wide array of civil rights claims.’”); 
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967) (explaining that the “new subdivision (b)(2) 
[was built] on experience mainly, but not exclusively, in the civil rights field”). 
 40.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 41.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (emphasis added).   
 42.   See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 703–04; see Frank, supra note 22, at 267 
(“Put at its simplest, what new Rule 23[(b)(2)] did . . . [was] make sure that suits against segregation, 
as well as other civil rights cases, would be within the class action rule and would be binding as to all 
members of the class liberally conceived . . . .”) 
 43.   7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 26–28 & nn.37–40. 
 44.   Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 45.   Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 46.   See 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 26–28 (recognizing the distinction).  But see 
Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629, 647 n.57 (1965) (doubting 
the distinction). 
 47.   See Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in Class Actions, 
60 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 764 (2012).   
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curb systemic misconduct through litigation.48 
B. Aggregation as a Force for Addressing Civil Rights Opposition 
The history of the modern class action rule, enacted in 1966, was 
intimately interwoven with that of the broader civil rights struggle of the 
time.49  As one of the drafters and Advisory Committee Members, John P. 
Frank, revealed: 
If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of the [Advisory] [C]ommittee, 
the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm 
determination to create a class action system which could deal with civil 
rights and, explicitly, segregation.  The one part of the rule which was 
never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the spirit of the 
times, we might well have had no rule at all.50 
The drafters of the modern class action rule worked before a backdrop 
of intransigence and fierce resistance to desegregation efforts, especially 
in the south.  Following Brown’s holding that the “separate but equal” 
doctrine in public schools was unconstitutional, southern backlash was 
severe.51  Thus, when amending Rule 23 in 1966, the drafters were 
informed by and motivated to overcome obstructionist procedural barriers 
erected by legislative and judicial forces.52 
State legislatures deliberately erected barriers, such as state pupil 
assignment laws to preserve segregated schools.53  In an effort to keep 
                                                            
 48.   Id. (noting that drafters of (b)(2) were unsurprisingly “motivated by equitable concerns”); 
id. at 764–65 (“The expansion of class action access to . . . litigants [challenging systemic civil rights 
violations and discrimination] constituted an attempt to make our procedural system more equitable 
by creating a means for individuals to bring injunction-based reform litigation.”). 
 49.   Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 678–79. 
 50.   See Frank, supra note 22, at 266. 
 51.   Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 692. 
 52.  Justice Department Assistant Attorney General and 1963 Advisory Committee Member 
Louis Oberdorfer conceded the unpopularity of civil rights and labor cases at the time.  In revising the 
class action rule, the drafters proposed Rule 23(a), which stated that “[o]ne or more members of a class 
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if [numerosity, commonality, 
typicality and adequacy were met].”  Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the United States District Courts (Mar. 15, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-8004, 2, 3 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (emphasis 
added).  Oberdorfer questioned whether the term “only” “might be overemphasized by courts to bar 
class actions in unpopular civil rights, labor, or other similar fields.”  Letter from Assistant Attorney 
General Louis Oberdorfer to Benjamin Kaplan (Feb. 12, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 2, 3 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 53.   Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 684.  As Columbia Professor of Law and former 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Lawyer Jack Greenberg recalls: 
[M]ost southern states passed laws, known as pupil placement laws, which prescribed 
procedures for application and transfer by individual black children to white schools.  
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schools de facto segregated following Brown, local school boards would 
individually assign students to schools according to race.54  Such boards 
purposefully manufactured individualized issues via pupil assignment 
laws, thereby making it difficult for African-American students to 
collectively act through class actions.55 
For example, in Potts v. Flax,56 the Fort Worth Independent School 
District established a pupil assignment law post-Brown, in an attempt to 
preserve a segregated public school system.57  While admitting the 
existence and binding effect of Brown, the School Board nonetheless 
continued to maintain a seventy-eight-year-old segregated school system 
because of the Board’s unabashed support of segregation.58  African-
American students challenged the pupil assignment law as 
unconstitutional and sought relief as a class action.59  The School Board 
balked at the district court judge’s purported need to order the Board to 
implement its law in a non-discriminatory manner, arguing that an ad hoc 
approach was best.60  Based on “uncontradicted evidence,” of the Board’s 
“categorical[l] reaffirm[ance of] its adherence to the formal policy of a 
segregated system” the court left nothing to chance and issued an order 
abolishing the pupil assignment law and requiring a concrete 
desegregation plan.61 
Alternatively, the School Board contended that even if the court had 
the authority to issue a desegregation order as to the individual plaintiffs, 
the court could not expand this to all those similarly situated.62  The Board 
maintained that because admission, assignment and transfer of African-
American students had to be done on an individualized basis under the 
pupil assignment law, a class action challenging the law was improper.63  
Thus, the Board appealed the district court’s certification of a class of 
African-American children challenging the School District’s pupil 
assignment scheme as racially discriminatory.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed 
                                                            
Although these transparently were stratagems for maintaining segregation, and although 
efforts to transfer routinely were frustrated, the courts, including the Supreme Court, for 
many years upheld the laws. 
Greenberg, supra note 39, at 580. 
 54.   Greenberg, supra note 39, at 580; Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 684. 
 55.   See Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 684–85. 
 56.   Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963). 
 57.   Id. at 286–87. 
 58.   Id. 
 59.   Id. at 286. 
 60.   Id. at 287. 
 61.   Id. at 287–88. 
 62.   Id. at 288. 
 63.   Id. 
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class certification, concluding, inter alia: 
The issue of law—may the School Board constitutionally assign Negro 
children to schools solely by reason of race?—was common to every 
Negro child in the Fort Worth District. . . . [Moreover,] there was not the 
slightest suggestion either on the trial (or since) that within the large mass 
there was any substantial conflict either in interest or in the legal 
positions to be advanced.64 
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Board’s attempt to cast the case in terms 
of individual rights and remedies, and instead recognized the group-wide 
harm and appropriate group-wide relief:65 
[P]erhaps most important, the relief to the class . . . was a good deal more 
than something merely appropriate.  There is at least considerable doubt 
that relief confined to individual specified Negro children either could 
be granted or, if granted, could be so limited in its operative effect.  By 
the very nature of the controversy, the attack is on the unconstitutional 
practice of racial discrimination.  Once that is found to exist, the Court 
must order that it be discontinued.66 
To order something shy of this would be akin to court’s outright 
endorsement of segregation: “[T]o require a school system to admit the 
specific successful plaintiff Negro child while others, having no such 
protection, were required to attend schools in a racially segregated system, 
would be for the court to contribute actively to the class discrimination 
proscribed.”67 
The Fifth Circuit goes so far to say that alternatively, even if the 
district court erred in certifying the class action and issuing class-wide 
relief, the error was harmless because the relief would have been 
                                                            
 64.   Id. at 289. 
 65.   Id. at 288–89 (“Properly construed the purpose of the suit was not to achieve specific 
assignment of specific children to any specific grade or school.  The peculiar rights of specific 
individuals were not in controversy.  It was directed at the system-wide policy of racial segregation.  
It sought obliteration of that policy of system-wide racial discrimination.”); see also id. at 289 n.5 
(“[A] school segregation suit presents more than a claim of invidious discrimination to individuals by 
reason of a universal policy of segregation.  It involves a discrimination against a class as a class, and 
this is assuredly appropriate for class relief.”) (emphasis added). 
 66.   Id. at 288–90.  Jack Greenberg makes a similar point, noting that the school desegregation 
cases focused on specific African-American students who sought transfer to specific white schools.  
The courts later recognized that Brown required more—i.e. an African-American child’s right to an 
integrated public school system.  This broader understanding of Brown’s mandate meant that a single 
plaintiff could desegregate all of the schools in one lawsuit, regardless of its class action status.  While 
aggregation would be appropriate, it would effectively be “surplusage.”  Greenberg, supra note 39, at 
580–81. 
 67.   Potts, 313 F.2d at 289. 
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pragmatically speaking the same if limited to the named plaintiffs. 
Potts illustrates not only the ways in which states attempted to obstruct 
Brown’s desegregation mandate through pupil assignment laws, but also 
the ways in which judges countered such obstruction.  By way of class 
certification, judges formally tailored the scope of relief to a relevant class 
to avoid the potential unfairness that could result from excluding non-
parties in desegregation orders.  Where such protection could not be 
perfected through the class action, it would be up to subsequent judges to 
determine the preclusive effect of the desegregation order. 
Such discretion meant that judges sympathetic to segregation could 
easily undermine the scope and speed of compliance with Brown.68  Such 
judges denied certification of classes seeking to integrate public schools 
by relying on the largely theoretical possibility that class members’ 
interests might diverge,69 or that only individuals could assert their rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.70 
Another example of this phenomenon at the time is Brunson v. Board 
of Trustees.71  Like Potts, forty-two African-American school children 
challenged the Clarendon County School District for operating a racially 
segregated school system post-Brown.72  Like many southern states,73 
South Carolina had enacted a pupil placement statute, giving the School 
Board the power to decide whether a student could transfer from his or her 
assigned school to another one of the student’s choice.74 
The students brought the case as a “spurious” class action on account 
that each student had his or her own right.75  The district court struck the 
class allegations in the complaint challenging the county’s segregated 
                                                            
 68.   See 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1752, at 23–24 (“Questions relating to the availability of 
class actions in matters involving racial discrimination led to some difficulty.”). 
 69.   Id. § 1752, at 26 n.35 (“The holdings . . . that actions to end segregation were not proper 
class actions because some Negroes favored these suits while others were opposed to them clearly 
were unsound.”); but see Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action, supra note 28, at 601 
(explaining that some courts overlooked individual litigant preferences regarding potential 
desegregation remedies, disregarding such conflicts of interest in favor of class certification). 
 70.   Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 682–83 (emphasis added); see 7A WRIGHT, 
supra note 16, § 1752 at 25–26 (“there were courts that refused to permit a class action in this 
context”); see e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956) (concluding that African-
American students desegregate schools “as individuals, not as a class or group; and it is as individuals 
that their rights under the Constitution are asserted”). 
 71.   311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962). 
 72.   Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees, 30 F.R.D. 369, 369–70 (E.D.S.D. 1962). 
 73.   See, e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Texas law); Carson v. 
Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) (applying North Carolina law); Carson v. Bd. of Educ., 227 
F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955) (applying North Carolina law). 
 74.   Brunson, 30 F.R.D. at 371. 
 75.   Id. at 370. 
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school system under the Fourteenth Amendment.76  In determining 
whether there was a common question of law or fact that would justify 
certification, the district court judge espoused a particularly narrow view 
of Brown’s desegregation mandate, and a particularly expansive view of 
the School Board’s considerations under its pupil assignment law. 
In an opinion that did not even mention Brown’s name, the district 
court judge exhorted all of the things Brown did not decide: 
It has not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulate the 
public schools of the states.  It has not decided that the states must mix 
persons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend 
schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they 
attend.77 
The judge justified segregation post-Brown by outrageously 
suggesting in 1962 that it was voluntary: 
[I]f the schools which [the state] maintains are open to children of all 
races, no violation of the Constitution is involved even though the 
children of different races voluntarily attend different schools, as they 
attend different churches. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation 
upon the exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation 
upon the freedom of individuals.78 
The judge concluded that the law was settled and that there was no 
common legal question to decide.  The judge also concluded that there was 
no common question of fact by adopting the School Board’s 
characterization of a highly individualized pupil assignment process: 
In determining the school to which a pupil is entitled to go, a School 
Board must consider a great many factors unrelated to race, such as 
geography, availability of bus transportation, availability of classroom 
space, and scholastic attainment. . . . There is no allegation in the 
complaint showing that the factual situation with reference to each of the 
plaintiffs is the same.  Undoubtedly the plaintiffs reside in different 
places, they are of different ages, they are of different scholastic 
attainment. . . . This [pupil assignment] statute provides that the case of 
each child shall be considered individually.79 
The School Board’s divide-and-conquer strategy effectively masked 
the common question of whether race was the determinant for pupil 
                                                            
 76.   Id. at 372. 
 77.   Id. at 371. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Id. 
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assignments.  The fact that plaintiffs were not identical sufficed to make 
the pupil assignment decision riddled with individual questions and the 
case inappropriate for certification.80  Not only did the judge swallow the 
School Board’s manufactured individualism whole, he also concluded that 
the equal protection claims could only be pursued individually, thereby 
foreclosing collective action.81 
The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to bring their case collectively.  For starters, the Fourth Circuit 
was not fooled into thinking that the myriad of possible individual factors 
explained Clarendon County’s completely segregated public school 
system: 
[T]he defendants are operating a biracial school system in which all 
assignments are on the basis of race. . . . The complaint does not present 
those disparate factual controversies which the District Court 
envisioned.82 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that threaded throughout the case was 
the common question of whether the School Board involuntarily assigned 
students on the basis of race, thereby making certification proper.83 
Moreover, while conceding that it had held “that rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment are individual and are to be individually 
asserted[,]” the Fourth Circuit observed that “comparable cases have been 
almost uniformly brought as spurious class actions” and involved common 
questions.84  Indeed, “[u]ntil the desegregation process is largely 
accomplished, many subsequent cases may be expected to present 
common questions of fact, for many individuals are likely to be affected 
in substantially the same way so long as a school board continues old 
discriminatory practices.”85  That constitutional claims were several was 
no bar to collective action. 
Upon the Fourth Circuit’s reversal and remand, the outcome was quite 
different, with a different district court judge’s not only certifying the 
                                                            
 80.   Id. at 372; see also Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1962) (holding 
that the district court found “no common question of fact because the School Board was entitled to 
consider a great many factors other than race in assigning individuals to particular schools”). 
 81.   Brunson, 30 F.R.D. at 372 (“It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the 
law. . . .  [H]e alone may complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded.  He has the right 
to enforce this constitutional privilege or he has the right to waive it.”). 
 82.   Brunson, 311 F.2d at 109. 
 83.   Id. In fact, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the court’s consideration of these problems is 
facilitated by the presence of multiple plaintiffs.” Id. 
 84.   Id. 
 85.   Id. 
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class, but ordering the School Board to admit and enroll African-American 
students wishing to attend White schools.86  While the School District 
conceded that it operated racially separate White and Black elementary 
and high schools, and contended that this “system is maintained in 
accordance with the wishes and desires of the great majority of parents of 
both races,” and “places each child in the school to which he is best suited 
for educational potential,”87 the court issued findings of fact quite to the 
contrary.88  The court found that defendants continued to maintain a 
“compulsory biracial school system” in which no White or African-
American child had ever been assigned to a school comprised of those of 
the other race.89  The School District’s explanations for its post-Brown 
segregated public school system were exposed as a sham and violation of 
the Constitution: 
The defendants have made no substantial effort to comply with . . . the 
Brown decisions. . . . Neither have they proposed any plan to implement 
these desegregation decisions, and have indicated . . . that they have no 
present intentions to do so. . . . [T]his Court must conclude that the 
defendants . . . are acting . . . to deprive the plaintiffs and others of their 
class of their constitutional rights, under the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Defendants are 
operating the schools . . . in a discriminatory manner based exclusively 
upon the race of the students . . . [,] precisely the practice condemned in 
the field of public education by . . . Brown . . . .90 
Over the objections of the School District that segregated schools were 
in the best interests of both races and in accordance with the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause, the district court judge had to 
reiterate that “Brown . . . has clearly and unmistakenly declared that in the 
field of public education discrimination against an individual based upon 
race is injurious to the aggrieved person and denies him certain 
fundamental constitutional rights.”91  Where the School District’s pupil 
assignment law operated as a burden to those pursuing their constitutional 
claims,92 the court did not require them to exhaust state administrative 
remedies, but rather granted them class-wide injunctive relief.93  In sum, 
                                                            
 86.   Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees, 244 F. Supp. 859, 859–60 (E.D.S.C. 1965). 
 87.   Id. at 860. 
 88.   Id. at 861–62. 
 89.   Id. at 861. 
 90.   Id. 
 91.   Id. at 862. 
 92.   Id. at 863. 
 93.   Id. at 863–65.  The defendants were ordered to immediately admit and enroll the nine 
students whose claims had not yet become moot.  Id. at 863.  The court, however, gave the defendants 
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the Brunson story illustrates how malleable and subject to manipulation 
the class certification determination could be and was prior to the modern 
class action rule. 
Judges also deprived litigants of meaningful relief via class 
certification denials in other ways.  For example, an individual student’s 
school desegregation case would be mooted by the student’s graduation 
from his home school.94  Or, in the event that an individual student 
prevailed in his desegregation suit, he would be deprived of broad 
systemic relief that would desegregate the school for others.95 
In light of such legislative and judicial tactics, the drafters sought to 
create a Rule 23 provision that would address such sabotage.  The 
Advisory Committee moved to create an effective procedural tool that 
would more easily enable and incentivize courts to issue systemic 
desegregation orders post-Brown.96 
Moreover, the Committee also sought to enable private citizens to 
supplement federal agency efforts in bringing about systemic change.  The 
drafters understood the importance of private enforcement that emerged 
from historic federal civil rights statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.97  This Act effectively deputized citizens to act as private attorneys-
general when enforcing federal statutory civil rights.98  As Advisory 
Committee Member John P. Frank revealed, Rule 23’s 1966 re-write took 
place “in direct parallel to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the race 
relations echo of that decade was always in the committee room.”99 
                                                            
more time to admit others similarly situated because of practical concerns.  Id. at 863–64. 
 94.   See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 679. 
 95.   Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 859 (2016); Marcus, Flawed but 
Noble, supra note 13, at 679–80, 710. 
 96.   See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 709–10. 
 97.   Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 98.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) 
(recognizing “private attorney general” in Title VII case brought by private plaintiffs); Suzette 
Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 488 n.195 (2014) [hereinafter 
Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough] (“As recognized by the Supreme Court and Congress, class 
actions are part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.”); see contra Lawyers for Justice, et al, Comment 
to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee: To Restore a Relationship Between Classes and Their 
Actions: A Call for Meaningful Reform of Rule 23 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/13-CV-G-suggestion.pdf (“Some practitioners 
and commentators justify today’s usage of Rule 23 as comprising a ‘private attorneys general’ system 
that forces compliance with legal standards that would otherwise escape punishment.  But our legal 
system already has public attorneys general and many other avenues for bringing about the outcomes 
that are preferred by those who justify Rule 23 in that way.”). 
 99.   Frank, supra note 22, at 266.  Frank further noted the importance of the “social setting, for 
this had a most direct bearing on this rule.”  Id. 
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Interestingly, some of the rule’s architects themselves were personally 
involved in the civil rights issue of the time—desegregation.100  Reporter 
Professor Benjamin Kaplan, for example, worked with the NAACP on 
desegregation litigation in the 1940s.101  Associate Reporter Professor 
Albert M. Sacks also advised the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund102 and marched with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. at the 
March on Washington in August of 1963, just two months before a key 
Advisory Committee meeting was held on revisions to Rule 23.103  
Committee Member Professor Charles Alan Wright worked vigorously in 
Texas against segregation: fighting the state legislature’s enactment of 
pupil placement laws that would thwart Brown; leading campaigns to 
desegregate his church and children’s private school; and later delivering 
a memorial address at the state university for the Reverend Martin Luther 
King, Jr.104  Finally, Committee Member John P. Frank, Esq. advised 
Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
pre-Brown, and wrote an amicus brief on behalf of almost 200 law 
professors in Sweatt v. Painter,105 which held segregation at the University 
of Texas Law School unconstitutional.106  Primary drafters had skin in the 
game.107  Not surprisingly, their commitment to civil rights was consistent 
                                                            
 100.   I am grateful to Professor David Marcus for bringing this important history to my attention 
in his work.  See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 702-03. 
 101.   Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 13, at 692, 702; see also Arthur R. Miller, In 
Memoriam: Benjamin Kaplan, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1354, 1357 & n.8 (describing how “certain critical 
elements of Federal Rule 23 on class actions were drafted” by Kaplan and that “everyone connected 
with the revision of the rule saw the procedure as essential in the civil rights field”). 
 102.   Greenberg, supra note 39, at 577 (recognizing Sacks’s role as an instructor at the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund’s training sessions over a period of years). 
 103.   Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 702–03.  The Advisory Committee would meet 
October 31 to November 2, 1963 to discuss amendments to Rule 23.  See also Alfonso A. Narvaezs, 
Albert M. Sacks, 70, Harvard Law Dean and Noted Teacher, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/23/obituaries/albert-m-sacks-70-harvard-law-dean-and-noted-
teacher.html (noting Sack’s service on the United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Massachusetts Attorney General’s advisory committee on civil rights and civil 
liberties). 
 104.   Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 13, at 703. 
 105.   339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 106.   Adam Liptak, J.P. Frank, 84, a Lawyer in Landmark Cases, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/10/us/j-p-frank-84-a-lawyer-in-landmark-cases-dies.html. 
 107.   Other Advisory Committee members were leaders in the desegregation efforts of the time.  
For example, William T. Coleman, Jr. was a pioneer in the civil rights area.  Matt Schudel, William T. 
Coleman Jr., Barrier-Breaking Civil Rights Lawyer, Cabinet Officer, Dies at 96, WASH. POST (Mar. 
31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/william-t-coleman-jr-transportation-secretary-
and-civil-rights-lawyer-dies-at-96/2017/03/31/94c21ce6-1624-11e7-833c-503e1f6394c9_ 
story.html?utm_term=.6ebeaa1bd82c; see also Abraham L. Freedman Papers: Collection Overview, 
TEMPLE UNIV. LIBRARY, https://library.temple.edu/scrc/abraham-l-freedman-papers (last visited Nov. 
21, 2017) (Advisory Committee Member Abraham Freedman was involved in desegregating Girard 
College, representing minorities in housing discrimination cases, and combatting employment and 
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with their work on the Advisory Committee. 
C. The Story of How the Original Drafters Crafted the Modern Civil 
Rights Class Action Rule 
The drafters were unified around creating an effective procedural tool 
to address significant backlash to integration.  They wrestled, however, 
with a variety of complex issues.  The drafters debated issues of res 
judicata, individual liberty and due process, and the form and scope of the 
rule itself.108  The historical record reveals a serious examination of these 
seminal issues.109 
1. Res Judicata 
First, central to aggregate litigation is the extent to which a collective 
action will bind others and preclude them from bringing their own actions.  
Of particular concern over the modern class action rule’s development was 
the res judicata effect of a class judgment and whether it would unfairly 
capture individual class members.  The res judicata debate is reflected 
early on in the Committee’s 1962 Deskbook.110  In this tentative proposal 
to modify Rule 23, there is an explication of Hansberry v. Lee,111 and the 
recognition of res judicata as a public policy choice.  The 1962 Deskbook 
explains: “The Hansberry case is consistent with this view that a class 
action is not ousted by the mere fact that some members do not relish the 
litigation.  Other factors were at work in Hansberry.”112 
Hansberry v. Lee is the Supreme Court decision upon which the 
                                                            
education anti-Semitism discrimination); Charles Joiner Obituary (1916-2017), THE ANN ARBOR 
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2017), http://obits.mlive.com/obituaries/annarbor/obituary.aspx?pid= 
184500638 (Advisory Committee Member Charles Joiner was a “Life Member of the NAACP”); 
Arthur J. Freund Papers, 1884-1975, MISSOURI HISTORY MUSEUM, http://collections.mohistory.org/ 
resources/102992 (Advisory Committee Member Arthur J. Freund was a “prominent St. Louis 
attorney and civil rights advocate”). 
 108.   See infra notes 109–181 and accompanying text.  
 109.   Advisory Committee member and drafter John P. Frank recognized the gravitas of the task 
twenty years after the rule’s revision: “This was a committee which in every respect was prepared to 
think big.  Rulemaking was a high profile and significant activity.  All meetings of the committee were 
held in the Supreme Court building and Chief Justice Warren often dropped in for portions of the 
meetings.”  Frank, supra note 22, at 265. 
 110.   The Deskbook is the “preliminary memorandum” of the Advisory Committee.  1962 
Deskbook Topic EE: Tentative Proposal to Modify Provisions Governing Class Actions—Rule 23, in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6309, 1 
(Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter 1962 Deskbook]. 
 111.   311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
 112.   1962 Deskbook, supra note 110, at 23–25, 27. 
2017 THE MODERN CLASS ACTION RULE 343 
award-winning “A Raisin in the Sun” was inspired.113  The author of the 
play, Lorraine Hansberry, was the youngest child of an African-American 
family who purchased property in an all-White neighborhood in 
Chicago.114  Their effort to live in the neighborhood was obstructed by 
Anna M. Lee and other White neighbors, who brought an action in the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, on behalf of themselves and other 
landowners, to enforce a racially restrictive covenant and enjoin the 
Hansberry family from moving into the neighborhood.115  The covenant, 
entered into by about 500 landowners, stipulated both that “for a specified 
period no part of the land should be ‘sold, leased to or permitted to be 
occupied by any person of the colored race,’” and that ninety-five percent 
of the landowners had to have signed the agreement for it to be valid.116  
Lorraine Hansberry’s father, Carl Augustus Hansberry, had purchased 
land from an owner who had signed the agreement, leading White 
plaintiffs to bring a class action alleging breach of the covenant and 
seeking an injunction.117  However, the Hansberry family and other 
defendants contended that the agreement was invalid because it had not 
been signed by the requisite ninety-five percent.118 
Plaintiffs contended that the validity of the covenant had been 
determined in a prior Illinois state court action, Burke v. Kleiman,119 and 
therefore the issue was res judicata in this case.  Defendants rebutted that 
they could not be bound by the prior judgment because they were not 
parties to the prior suit nor in privity with any of the parties or successors 
in interest to the prior suit.120  The defendants further argued that binding 
them to the prior judgment in Burke v. Kleiman would deny them due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.121 
No matter.  The Circuit Court concluded that res judicata applied to 
the Hansberrys, even after finding on the merits that only fifty-four percent 
of the owners had signed the agreement and that the ninety-five percent 
                                                            
 113.   The play is about an African-American family who considers moving into a white 
neighborhood, and won the New York Drama Critics’ Circle Award.  ANNE CHENEY, LORRAINE 
HANSBERRY 26 (Twayne 1984); Jay Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Rise of the Modern Class 
Action, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 217, 217 (Kevin M. Clermont, 1st ed., 2004).  For a rich, 
contextualized story of Hansberry v. Lee, see generally id. at 217–79. 
 114.   Tidmarsh, supra note 113, at 217.  
 115.   Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 32, 37–38. 
 116.   Id. at 37–38. 
 117.   Id. at 32, 37–38. 
 118.   Id. at 38. 
 119.   277 Ill. App. 519 (1934). 
 120.   Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38. 
 121.   Id. 
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figure had been the result of a “false and fraudulent stipulation.”122  The 
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, concluding that the prior Burke v. 
Kleiman case was a class or representative action, and that the Hansberrys 
were members of that plaintiff class seeking to enforce the covenant and 
were thus bound by its decree.123  Although the stipulation about ninety-
five percent owner-support was deemed erroneous but neither fraudulent 
nor collusive,124 this did not change the binding nature of the prior Burke 
v. Kleiman class action judgment.125  The Hansberrys appealed this ruling 
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
constitutionality of binding the Hansberrys to the prior judgment. 
While giving a nod to federalism, the Supreme Court made clear its 
role in protecting constitutional due process.126  Hansberry established that 
although one is not bound by a judgment in a case in which he is not a 
party, the significant exception to that rule is a class or representative 
action.127  Where a party shares the same interests as a non-party and the 
former adequately represents the latter’s interest, a judgment in a class 
action comports with due process and may have res judicata effect.128  
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the Hansberrys—who 
sought to discredit the racially restrictive covenant—were not members of 
the plaintiff class in Burke v. Kleiman who sought to enforce the 
covenant.129  This blatant conflict of interest ran counter to due process 
requirements.130  Moreover, the defendants in Burke v. Kleiman had not 
been designated as a class of landowners resisting the covenant’s 
performance, which could have arguably bound the Hansberrys or 
foreclosed their defense.131 
Hansberry set a constitutional floor from which the rulemakers could 
establish the res judicata effect of class action decrees.  The 1962 
Deskbook indicates that Hansberry was a good reminder that the 
preclusive impact of class judgments was not a foregone conclusion, but a 
                                                            
 122.   Id. 
 123.   Id. at 39. 
 124.   Id. 
 125.   Id. at 39–40. 
 126.   Id. at 40. 
 127.   Id. at 40–41. 
 128.   Id. at 41–43. 
 129.   Id. at 44–45 (“It is plain that in such circumstances all those alleged to be bound by the 
agreement would not constitute a single class in any litigation brought to enforce it.  Those who sought 
to secure its benefits by enforcing it could not be said to be in the same class with or represent those 
whose interest was in resisting performance . . . .”). 
 130.   Id. at 45 (“[R]epresentatives . . . whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even 
probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to 
absent parties which due process requires.”). 
 131.   Id. at 45–46. 
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policy choice—apropos for an equitable doctrine: 
While the class action should look toward a binding adjudication as the 
norm, this result cannot be assured in the action itself; for the question 
of binding effect can only come up for effective decision in a later action.  
Moreover, the question of res judicata may be materially influenced by 
what has occurred between the time of judgment and the time the 
question arises for decision.  For example, suppose a class action by 
Negro plaintiffs asserting civil rights in one or another context.  The 
action may satisfy the requirements for a class action with, 
presumptively, binding effect on the class.  Suppose the judgment is for 
the defendant.  Manifestly, if the condition of law changes favorably to 
the asserted civil rights, the judgment will not preclude a later action by 
members of the class for the same relief earlier claimed.  Speaking more 
generally, res judicata is merely the expression of one public policy, and 
“as the embodiment of a public policy, [it] must, at times, be weighed 
against competing interests, and must, on occasion, yield to other 
policies.”132 
The rulemakers clashed over whether Rule 23(b)(2) would invite res 
judicata abuse and whether Hansberry was an effective prophylactic for 
such abuse.  For example, in a January 21, 1963 letter from Committee 
Member John P. Frank to Reporter Benjamin Kaplan, Frank expressed this 
concern: 
Without doubting for a moment the immense utility of class actions and 
the importance of making them available to their full proper limit, the 
presumption I think ought to be against them particularly where they are 
to be res judicata as to others because of the loss of individual liberty 
involved where the individual is deprived from tending to his own 
business. . . . With regard to your paragraph (c)(2) [the precursor to 
(b)(2)], I am in deep trouble.  These are particularly the civil rights cases.  
Instinct tells me that in the civil rights field we would be better off with 
stare decisis, but my good friends Charlie Wright and Skelly Wright tell 
me I am wrong, and this may well be a case in which two “wrights” do 
make me wrong.  My theory is that such class actions could be used to 
achieve res judicata results of a most destructive sort and that to permit 
this particular use broadens class actions beyond their other utility.  
Hansberry v. Lee gives more comfort to others than it does to me.  The 
language you have chosen for this paragraph seems to me to have no 
limitation at all and that so long as enough people are involved, almost 
any situation could give rise to a class action. . . . In short, given numbers 
and a common problem, the [(b)(2) precursor] language seems to me to 
include the universe and to exclude nothing.133 
                                                            
 132.   1962 Deskbook, supra note 110, at 27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 133.   Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Jan. 21, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6312, 8, 9–10 (Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(emphasis added). 
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Reporter Kaplan was assuaged that Hansberry, the rule’s own 
adequacy of representation requirement, and the Court’s flexible 
application of the equitable doctrine provided sufficient protection from 
res judicata abuse.  Kaplan’s February 7, 1963 letter in response to Frank 
explains: 
As to the “binding” effect of an erroneous judgment in a civil-rights class 
action which for one reason or another is not corrected by appeal, note 
that subdivision (a) would initially call for adequate representation, and 
there is the backstop of Hansberry v. Lee.  Moreover, . . . the Court is not 
likely to apply ordinary ideas of former adjudication if by reason of an 
erroneous decision in a class action a particular school or county became 
a legal anomoly [sic].134 
Committee Member Wright also concluded that not only was 
Hansberry sufficient, but the concern over res judicata abuse was 
overblown and unfounded in the context of desegregation jurisprudence.  
In a February 16, 1963 letter from Committee Member Charles Wright to 
Reporter Kaplan, the former seemed to see res judicata abuse as a red 
herring that would further greenlight southern resistance to desegregation: 
For myself, Hansberry seems a complete answer to such fears, but if 
another answer is required, here it is.  For nine years astute Southern 
lawyers have sought by every means to stop or delay the desegregation 
process.  That the class action device is available for desegregation 
cases has been amply demonstrated by a long list of cases.  I have 
followed this kind of litigation with much care, and have yet to see a case 
in which a collusive class suit has even been attempted in the hope that 
it would have destructive res judicata effect.  There is only one case I 
know of which is even colorably in this class, though here I think the 
original action was a good faith action which was merely premature.135 
After much debate, the rulemakers crafted a modern rule that 
eliminated the non-binding “spurious” class altogether, and provided 
sufficient safeguards and flexibility that justified res judicata for all class 
judgments.  Reporter Kaplan noted this advance in the October 31st to 
November 2nd, 1963 Civil Rules Committee Meeting: 
                                                            
 134.   Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank, (Feb. 7, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6312, 16, 18 (Cong. Info. Serv.); 
see also Kaplan, supra note 39, at 389 n.128 (noting the potential risk of res judicata in a (b)(2) civil 
rights class action where plaintiffs have lost on the merits and the law has subsequently changed, but 
concluding that this risk is reduced by “precedent for limiting res judicata effects of litigation when 
the legal ambience has changed”). 
 135.   Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (Feb. 16, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE 
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7004, 3, 5 (Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(emphasis added).  
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[W]e go on to the very important provision in (c)(2) which says that if 
an action is to be maintained as a class action of any one of the three 
categories, then the judgment in the action is to extend to the class, 
whether or not favorable to the class.  In other words, we have eliminated 
from Rule 23 the old style spurious action, where a suit normally called 
a class suit isn’t really that at all.  It seems to me that this is a notable 
advance . . . .136 
2. Individual Autonomy and Due Process 
Second, the drafters were at odds over the related issue of individual 
litigant autonomy.  John P. Frank, while a supporter of aggregation, felt 
strongly that it was best cabined because of its fundamental challenge to 
due process and individual liberty.  It informed his view on res judicata, 
and the scope of the rule itself.137  While his colleagues, including Reporter 
Kaplan, shared this concern, they were satisfied that the rule contained 
safety measures that protected this liberty interest,138 and urged Frank to 
think more outside the box in amending the rule.139  At the Civil Rules 
Meeting held in the fall of 1963, Frank addressed the Chair: 
I am, as to most of Topic . . . [Rule 23], really extremely happy.  I’m 
genuinely serious, I think this is a tremendous thing . . . . The class action 
is a very useful action, and at the same time it must be regarded as an 
exception, because it deprives a citizen of his right to his trial and to his 
day in court.  So that clearly we must balance the necessity on the one 
hand with plain individual liberty of a very basic sort on the other.140 
At the urging of his colleagues and with clarification made to the 
notes, by January 31, 1964, “Mr. Frank [was] reluctantly willing to see the 
individual’s liberty somewhat limited” at least with respect to the (b)(2) 
class.141  This was not true of (b)(3).  In his May 28, 1965 partial Dissent 
                                                            
 136.   Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions—EE, supra note 29, at 24.  This was not only 
notable, but to some commentators, it was “by far the most important contribution of amended Rule 
23” as well as “perhaps its most controversial.” 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 1:15 (5th ed. 2012). 
 137.   See Letter from John P. Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 22, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE 
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 9, 9–10 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.) (expressing enthusiasm about the categorical statement on the binding effect of spurious class 
actions and expressing concern about the potential scope of the proposed rule).  
 138.   Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), supra note 134, at 18, (“The 
question of individual freedom of action has concerned us and we believe we have respected this 
freedom.  See . . . [describing] considerations . . . and . . . procedural safeguards . . . .”). 
 139.   See id. at 18 (“A certain amount of cautious adventuresomeness is needed in revising the 
class-action Rule . . . .”). 
 140.   Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 30–31 (emphasis added). 
 141.   Letter from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks) (Jan. 31, 1964) in 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003, 6, 
11 (Cong. Info. Serv.).  
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to the Committee’s Rule 23 recommendations, Frank opposed the (b)(3) 
provision, largely because it offended individual autonomy: 
I would . . . delete section (b)(3) and the related portion of section (c)(2) 
[binding class members] for these reasons: . . . 
To me as a matter of plain individual liberty, every American should be 
able to make his own decisions about his own lawsuits, including 
whether to bring them at all.  Any class suit conflicts with this 
principle—a person is swept up will-nilly.  In some very limited 
categories, this is necessary . . . . [But t]he notion that this may be a 
convenient way to dispose of disputes leaves me stone-cold.  It is not 
difficult to think of convenient ways to do many things at the cost of 
individual liberty, but convenience should never be glorified at the 
expense of leaving with the individual the maximum possible right to 
decide whom and when he sues. 
Fundamentally, . . . the Rule 23 amendments, to the extent of my 
objection, involve determining the rights of persons who are not really 
effectively present to speak for themselves.  Because I am against this 
justitia in absentia, I have voted against . . . [some of the Rule 23] 
proposals.142 
Ultimately, however, the rulemakers coalesced around permitting 
aggregation for (b)(2) civil rights cases, allowing some loss of individual 
autonomy where class cohesiveness was insured by opposing party’s 
acting on grounds generally applicable to the class and seeking primarily 
class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief. 
3. Scope and Structure of the Rule 
Third, the drafters clashed over the appropriate availability of 
aggregation and breadth of the rule.  For example, some rulemakers 
expressed concern over the scope of Rule 23(b)(1)’s pre-cursor, fearing 
that it would include mass accidents.143  In a January 21, 1963 letter to 
Reporter Kaplan, Committee Member Frank flagged this concern early in 
the revision process: 
We now reach the heart of the matter, and it is here that I have my 
                                                            
 142.   Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank 
(May 28, 1965), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS 
No. CI-7107, 2, 2–3 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (emphasis added). 
 143.   See Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), supra note 134, at 17 
(“[Y]ou fear that the mass accident cases may creep in through [the Rule 23(b)(1) pre-cursor].  I, too, 
am anxious to keep them out.”). 
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greatest difficulty. . . . I wish we could have tighter language on the 
matters covered in your paragraph (c)(1) [Rule 23(b)(1)’s pre-cursor]. . . 
. But the Rule language is so broad that an immense amount more could 
get under this tent.  Let me illustrate.  I am, I believe, unpersuadably 
opposed to the use of the class action in the mass tort situation.  You 
seem, though less categorically opposed, unsympathetic to it yourself.144 
This concern, however, was not shared for the civil rights cases.  Frank 
lost consensus there.  In response to Frank, in a February 7, 1963 response 
letter, Reporter Kaplan discouraged such a cramped conception for civil 
rights cases: 
I agree with you that subdivision (c)(2) [Rule 23(b)(2)’s pre-cursor] 
needs very careful attention, and we should continue to search for better 
language so that unintended categories do not come in.  I do not, 
however, share your concern about taking in civil rights cases.  On 
analysis they seem to belong in the (c) category. 
If a school desegregation case, for example, is maintained by an 
individual on his own behalf, rather than as a class action, very likely the 
relief will be confined to admission of the individual to the school and 
will not encompass broad corrective measures—desegregation of the 
school.  This would be unfortunate.  But if the relief is to encompass 
broad corrective measures, then it is fitting that the action be conducted 
as a class action. 
I may add that if the action is not maintained as a class action, the 
contempt remedy would presumably not be available to anyone but the 
individual plaintiff, and others in similar position could be put to separate 
proceedings with ensuing delay.145 
This desire to protect desegregation cases from legislative and judicial 
backlash led to a related debate over the form of the rule itself.  In 
particular, the drafters differed over the propriety of creating a separate 
(b)(2) provision rather than including civil rights cases under Rule 
23(b)(1).  Rule 23(b)(1), as amended, would allow a class action to be 
maintained if: 
[P]rosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members 
would create a risk of: 
                                                            
 144.   See Letter from John P. Frank to Professor Benjamin Kaplan (Jan. 21, 1963), in RECORDS 
OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-6312, 8, 9–10 (Cong. 
Info. Serv.). 
 145.   See Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), supra note 134, at 17–18 
(paragraph breaks added). 
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  (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class; 146 or 
 (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a 
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the individual adjudications or would 
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests[.]147 
Alternatively, Rule 23(b)(2) would allow a class action to be 
maintained so long as “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class 
as a whole[.]”148 
John P. Frank argued on a number of occasions that Rule 23(b)(1)—a 
mandatory, binding class action that subsumed the vast majority of “true” 
class actions—offered a logical home for civil rights cases, thereby 
making (b)(2) redundant.149  On March 22, 1963, he wrote his fellow 
colleagues: 
As I see it, [the lines in Rule 23(b)(2)] are not necessary to reach the civil 
rights cases.  These are covered perfectly well (to me) by subdivision (1). 
. . . I can’t imagine more inconsistent results than a possible holding that 
a school should be segregated as to one applicant and not as to another.150 
His colleagues were unpersuaded.  Committee Member Charles Alan 
Wright shared his skepticism to Reporter Benjamin Kaplan in a March 30, 
1963 letter: 
John Frank’s proposal to drop subdivision[] (2) . . . of Rule 23(b) is not, 
                                                            
 146.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).  The Advisory Committee Note provides the following 
example: “individual litigations of the rights and duties of riparian owners . . . could create a possibility 
of incompatible adjudications.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 147.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). The Advisory Committee Note provides the following example: 
“when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 148.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 149.   Letter from John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 22, 1963), supra note 137, at 9, 11. 
 150.   Id.; see also Memorandum from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks) on 
Additional Points on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of March 15, 1963, in RECORDS OF 
THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001 (Cong. Info. Serv.), 
19, 21 (“Mr. Frank has suggested that (b)(2) may be unnecessary in the light of (b)(1)(A) and (B)(p. 
EE-1)”); Completion of Work of Comm. Meeting of Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7104, 4, 7–11 (Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(contending that (b)(2) and (b)(3) are unnecessary and that there is nothing worth doing under these 
provisions that cannot be done under (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B)). 
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at first blush, persuasive to me.  I do not think that (b)(1) by itself would 
reach the segregation cases.  It would not “establish incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class” to tell a school 
board that it must accept Smith in a white school but need not accept 
Jones.  This is exactly what the Fort Worth School Board wanted to be 
told in Potts v. Flax.  Nor do I see how a judgment that Smith must be 
accepted would “as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of 
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair 
or impede their ability to protect their interests.”  I would be delighted to 
drop all of (b), but oppose dropping (b)(2).151 
At the October 31st to November 2nd, 1963 Civil Rules Meeting, John 
P. Frank, while recognizing the importance of desegregation class actions, 
reiterated his disapproval of the (b)(2) option: 
I think we’ve got it in parts (b)(1)(A) and (B), that is to say if we 
reviewed the great bulk of the cases—and I’m now speaking of 95% of 
the cases which have been true class actions in the past, i.e. have been 
regarded as binding—they fall into those categories [quoting A and B]. . 
. . Those then become the two base situations.  Now as to those, the class 
action is essential. . . . As to those I think under the existing law it is 
binding, but if it isn’t it should be. . . . 
Therefore, when we take class (2), which are said to be the segregation 
cases, I am satisfied from extensive correspondence with Professor 
Wright and extensive conference with Judge Skelly Wright,152 and a 
review of the cases, that the integration cases need to be class actions. . 
. . But I believe they can be wholly subsumed by sections (A) and (B) of 
part (1).  In other words, these can be treated, I think, as varying 
adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
etc.—if one Negro is let in and another is held back.  I think that by a 
beefy note on that score we can cover that under (1)(A) adequately.153 
Reporter Benjamin Kaplan and Committee Member Charles Alan 
                                                            
 151.   Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 30, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE 
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 13, 15 (Cong. Info. 
Serv.).  
 152.  Judge Skelly Wright was appointed by President Kennedy to serve on the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Wright grew up in New Orleans where he attended all-white 
public high schools.  He went on to become a “pioneer in the desegregation of public schools and 
public transportation in his native New Orleans.”  Marjorie Hunter, Judge J. Skelly Wright, 
Segregation Foe Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1988/08/08/obituaries/judge-j-skelly-wright-segregation-foe-dies-at-77.html.  Judge Wright’s advice 
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desegregation. As Marjorie Hunter notes “In the months after his order to integrate the public schools 
in New Orleans in 1960, Judge Wright was shunned by old friends. A cross was burned on the lawn 
of his home. Telephone threats against his life became so numerous that police guards were assigned 
to protect him.” Id.  
 153.   Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 32 (emphasis and paragraph 
break added). 
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Wright balked at the notion that civil rights cases could be shoehorned into 
a (b)(1) class, noting the ease with which those opposed to integration 
could defeat class certification.  Kaplan responded to Frank at the Civil 
Rules Meeting as follows: 
Well, I would consider the elimination of those lines [re: (b)(2)] to be so 
retrograde a move that I don’t think we could go to the public with a rule 
so truncated.  To take your first point first, John [Frank], you are saying 
that in your view the ordinary desegregation case can be read under 
(1)(A) or (B).  Let me make first the observation that if by any chance 
the desegregation case could be found by a judge not to be a class action 
after the adoption of the rule, we would of course be in a very, very bad 
way.  If there is any doubt on the matter, we certainly ought to carry 
language which includes the desegregation suit.  So, if there be any 
question about it, (2) ought to remain in. 
Second, I don’t think the desegregation case is covered by either (1)(A) 
or (B), because I think that the cases leave open the distinct possibility 
that a Negro child may apply on his own behalf for admission to school 
and would be entitled to a decree in his favor alone.  I don’t think that a 
series of such suits would create “inconsistent or varying adjudications 
establishing incompatible standards of conduct” by the Board.  There are 
plenty of Boards who would be very happy to be engaged in what you 
call “incompatible standards of conduct.”  Nor do I think that an 
adjudication with respect to an individual (this is (B)) would be decisive 
of the issues of the class.  Now the cases suggest that this argument 
stands on the proposition that we have not got a law which says, as you 
seem to suggest it says, that an individual Negro student cannot maintain 
an action on his own.  So on all scores it seems to me that (2) must remain 
in to make it absolutely clear that desegregation cases—and (2) is not 
confined to deseg. but that can be taken as characteristic—to make sure 
that those cases are covered.154 
Wright made the same objections, flagging the propensity of local 
school boards and judges to successfully defeat and deny class 
certification based on a “divide and conquer” approach: 
Mr. Chairman, John [Frank] has again in his motion given what seem to 
me two very different problems.  On (2) I feel so strongly that he is wrong 
that once you agree, as he does, that segregation cases must be 
prosecuted as class actions (as certainly they must) you have to have (2) 
to take care of them.  It is simply torturing language to say that they 
involve “incompatible standards of conduct” and come under (1)(A). 
The proof of that I think is in the action of several Boards: the Fort Worth 
School Board in the case of [redacted], which said Yes, we’ll take 
[redacted], but we don’t want the order to require us to take other 
                                                            
 154.   Id. at 33–34 (emphasis and paragraph break added). 
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Negroes.  They found nothing incompatible.  The Clemson Board of 
Trustees, after they had already admitted Gantt, petitioned for certiorari 
unsuccessfully to have the class action aspects stricken from the decree.  
Or you can look to the decree which the district judge actually entered in 
Baily v. Paterson in Miss. after they had once won the case in the 
Supreme Court, and the decree was entered providing that the bus 
company must transport the three named plaintiffs without 
discrimination, but it could [illegible] to refuse all other Negroes.  These 
people opposing the class don’t find it incompatible. 
I don’t think it is incompatible.  So I think we must take care of these 
cases.  I don’t see that (2) is open to the dangers to which John [Frank] 
adverts, which I think may be very real dangers in (3).155 
In rejecting desegregation cases for Rule 23(b)(1) certification, the 
Committee members considered a number of cases, including Brunson and 
Potts, discussed supra, which illustrated the type of strong resistance to 
desegregation post-Brown and the course corrections needed.156 
Tellingly, much of the Committee’s criticism over potential 
amendments to Rule 23 was targeted to provision (b)(3).  Rule 23(b)(3) 
allows a class action to be maintained where “the court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.”157  This catch-all provision would bind classes far less 
cohesive than those contemplated under provisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), held 
together for convenience and efficiency brought about by the 
predominance of common questions.  Many “spurious” classes and those 
involving money damages could be accommodated by the (b)(3) 
provision. 
There was more consensus among the rulemakers that provision (b)(3) 
broke new ground and risked opening a Pandora’s box that could not be 
closed.158  To the extent that the rulemakers perceived this risk as bleeding 
                                                            
 155.   Id. at 35 (emphasis and paragraph breaks added). 
 156.   Memorandum from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks), supra note 150, 
at 21 (“Our proposed Rule 23(b)(2) (pp. EE–1-2), intended to reach a group of cases including the 
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27, 1963, 83 Sup. Ct. 1538. See also Gantt v. Clemson Ag. College of S.C., 6 F.R. Serv. 2d 23a.33, 
case 8 (4th Cir. 1963).”). 
 157.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 158.   See Carroll, supra note 95, at 861–63 (describing the controversial nature of the (b)(3) 
provision and reticence among the drafters to include it in the modern class action rule). 
354 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
over into provision (b)(2), they were critical of both provisions.  John P. 
Frank, in particular, seemed to conflate the two provisions, criticizing both 
in the same breath, despite their very different nature.159 
For example, Committee Member Frank sought to reign in what he 
saw as unbridled judicial discretion to certify cases under (b)(2) and 
(b)(3),160 believing that this could lead to an abuse of power: 
My opposition to divisions (2) and (3) is that they put no limit but the sky 
to class actions, leaving the entire matter to discretion in the particular 
case.  It must be remembered that despite the excellent notice provisions 
of the Rule, this is a discretion which must be exercised in the dark so 
far as the court is concerned.  The possibility of put-up jobs in strike suits 
is tremendous.161  I find nothing at all substantial in the materials . . . 
indicating any particular necessity for this wide open area. 
I would far rather take the excellent revision as you have it without these 
open door provisions and give them ten years for development.162 
To the extent that Frank’s disapproval applied to the (b)(3) class, his 
colleagues shared his reservations.  For example, in a March 30, 1963 
letter from Committee Member Charles Alan Wright to Reporter 
Benjamin Kaplan, Wright remarked: 
John Frank’s proposal to drop subdivisions (2) and (3) of Rule 23(b) is 
not, at first blush, persuasive to me. . . . I would be delighted to drop all 
of (b), but oppose dropping (b)(2).  On (b)(3) I am dubitante.163 
At the October 31st to November 2nd, 1963 Civil Rules Meeting, 
Frank—while recognizing the importance of desegregation class 
actions—reiterated his disapproval of (b)(2) along with (b)(3): 
As to the rest of it, namely part (2), and part (3) I myself do not believe 
it is at all necessary or proper to have class actions at all.  Remember 
always that these are binding, because we have eliminated the non-
binding class action.  I do not think that there is anything really worth 
doing under (2) or (3) that we cannot consume under (1)(A) or (B) 
                                                            
 159.   See generally id. (describing this conflation in the modern context).  
 160.   See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 161.   This refers to a pre-arranged lawsuit brought by plaintiffs to encourage settlement by the 
defendant where it would cost the latter less to settle than to litigate the case.  This concern would 
seem to fit proposed Rule 23(b)(3) more than (b)(2). 
 162.   Letter from John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 22, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, 9, 11 (Cong. Info. Serv.) 
(emphasis added). 
 163.   Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 30, 1963), supra note 151, at 
15 (emphasis added).   
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adequately, because I am so genuinely concerned about the interference 
with individual liberty and the possibility of fraud. I do not wish to see 
the class action made any more useful and usable than it has to be. . . . 
Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I believe that the social values involved by 
allowing sections (2) and (3) to become class actions at all, despite the 
isolated instances which are suggested, are far less valuable 
contributions than the detriment that comes from opening the doors to 
those practices and depriving those people of their rights.  And I 
therefore would move to delete [the language of Rule 23(b)(2) and 
(b)(3)] of the proposal.164 
At that Civil Rules Meeting, Committee members distinguished (b)(2) 
from (b)(3) in their response to Frank.  For example, Kaplan explained: 
When I spoke of a truncated rule being retrograde, I had in mind very 
much classification (3). . . . I grant you that the class action has to be 
carefully handled, but what closer safeguards can we provide than the 
ones we have.  So I would very much hope that we would not excise 
either of these categories [(b)(2) or (b)(3)].  I think it’s of the utmost 
importance that they be preserved.165 
Another example is Wright’s reaction: 
So I think we must take care of these cases.  I don’t see that (2) is open 
to the dangers to which John [Frank] adverts, which I think may be very 
real dangers in (3).166 
While there are genuine differences between (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes, 
Reporter Kaplan argued that the former could not exist without the latter.  
In an exchange with Committee Members Frank and Wright at the fall 
1963 Civil Rules Meeting, Reporter Kaplan posited that both provisions 
are necessary for the greater good: 
Mr. Frank: Mr. Chairman, may I explain. . . . [W]hat’s in [(b)](3) now, 
that’s as [Associate Reporter] Al[bert Sacks] has suggested, largely the 
present spurious class action, and they aren’t res judicata now.  So what 
we’re doing here is working a plain revolution, because we’re taking 
actions which would not have been res judicata and we’re making them 
res judicata. 
Kaplan: Now John [Frank], the very desegregation suits that are now 
being conducted are theoretically spurious class actions, but there isn’t 
                                                            
 164.   Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 32–33 (emphasis and 
paragraph break added). 
 165.   Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
 166.   Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
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a judge in the world that’s treating them that way, nor should they be 
treated that way. 
Mr. Frank: But we must separate those.  You and Charlie [Wright] feel 
that is a section (2) problem.  We’re confining ourselves at the moment 
to section (3). 
Kaplan: But I’m saying that the same thing is carrying over.  We are in 
the midst of a very important development which will enable courts to 
deal with diffuse litigation, and when you put a negative to (b)(3) you 
are chopping off that development with a knife, and let’s be perfectly 
clear that that’s what’s being done.  I say that it is incredible to me that 
we can go forward with a revision of the class suit rule and chop that 
development off and make it suitable.  I don’t see it.  It’s not possible.167 
For Frank, that (b)(2) and (b)(3) were so intertwined was a bridge too 
far.  In a painful example, he illustrates the purported futility of (b)(3) in a 
legal system that already offers alternative options for resolving 
duplicative litigation outside of aggregation: 
In my state, Judge Wyzanski168—I regret to say this—we kill an awful 
lot of Mexicans, and we do it by hauling them around in busses that are 
wholly inadequate.  We had seventeen killed in our state in one accident; 
California had 27 not so long ago.  These become compensatory cases, 
but we’ve had great success (particularly under Judge Boldt, a member 
of our central Committee, who came down and handled one of them) 
using devices which weren’t class actions, didn’t sacrifice anybody’s 
rights, but on the other hand were damned efficient, and we moved them 
through, and with a little pushing he got four sample cases and they 
moved those and accepted those results and we were done with them. . . 
. I confess that I am now ready to vote yes on all the rule except (3), 
tighten (2), and go home and be happy.169 
In recognition of the importance of creating an aggregate vehicle for 
desegregation cases in particular, Frank ultimately yielded to the inclusion 
of (b)(2).  Although Frank is an outlier in his view over which vehicle is 
best suited for civil rights enforcement, he shared the Committee’s 
commitment in providing one.170  His concern was over the scope of 
(b)(2)’s coverage, not its civil rights objective: 
                                                            
 167.   Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 
 168.   For background on Judge Wyzanski, see Eric Pace, Charles E. Wyzasnki, 80, is Dead; Judge 
on U.S. Court for 45 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/05/ 
obituaries/charles-e-wyzanski-80-is-dead-judge-on-us-court-for-45-years.html (noting he “won wide 
note with rulings on issues large and small in the 1960’s and the Vietnam War era”). 
 169.   Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 51 (emphasis added). 
 170.   See also id. at 61 (emphasis added) (Advisory Committee Member Judge Roszel C. 
Thomsen: “We certainly want (2) to cover the segregation cases.”). 
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Lines 25 to 28 [covering Rule 23(b)(2)] are included here because of the 
belief that they are needed to be sure that we cover the segregation case.  
I do not personally believe that to be so, in the sense that I believe that 
they can be perfectly adequately covered above; however, opinions that 
I am bound to respect come to the contrary conclusion, and so I yield the 
point, because certainly we want the segregation cases covered 
somewhere here. 
However, in the course of covering the segregation cases, we have in 
lines 25–28, I think, covered the universe as well.  The party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to 
the class, thereby making—in other words, for that reason—making 
appropriate specific or declaratory final relief with respect to the class as 
a whole.  Now, that covers the segregation cases alright, but it also 
covers matters which almost everybody in this room doesn’t have the 
faintest wish to cover, because this also in terms covers mass accidents. 
In any case of a mass accident where the asserted negligent party refuses 
to act, i.e., refuses to pay on grounds generally applicable to the class; to 
wit, denial of negligence, thereby we have a more than plausible, we 
have a probably interpretation that this covers that. It covers, in short, 
any conceivable refusal on the part of anybody to refuse to do what a 
large number of persons wish done, and that, it seems to me, is no 
possible basis for depriving individual American citizens of their rights 
to independent trials by itself.171 
After much hard work and careful thought, the civil rights provision 
of the modern class action rule—Rule 23(b)(2)—was approved.172  Even 
in his dissenting view, Frank applauded the goals achieved by the modern 
class rule: 
[P]arts (b)(1) and (2) absorb the former true and hybrid class actions; 
(b)(2) picks up the contemporary use of class actions in the race relations 
cases; and section (c)(2) makes judgments in these cases binding on the 
class.  The revision also greatly improves the devices to protect the class 
from abuse.  For these improvements, I applaud.173 
Ultimately, Committee Member Frank could not embrace the most 
controversial aspect of the modern aggregation rule174—the Rule 23(b)(3) 
                                                            
 171.   Id. at 60–61 (emphasis and paragraph breaks added). 
 172.   See Order Approving Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1031 
(1966). 
 173.   Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank 
(May 28, 1965), supra note 142, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 174.   John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, supra 
note 22, at 267 (“As a member of the committee, I dissented from the (b)(3) portion of the rule . . . .”); 
id. (“[T]he most sharply disputed question was whether to have Rule (b)(3) at all.”). 
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catch-all.175  His partial Dissent focuses on this provision: 
But having done so much good, the Rule proceeds to go an unnecessary 
and undesirable extra mile.  By section (b)(3) the Rule absorbs the old, 
spurious class action, and section (c)(2) makes this also binding on the 
class.  At this point a majority of my brothers and I part company. . . . I 
would therefore delete section (b)(3) and the related portion of section 
(c)(2) [making the class judgment binding] for . . . reasons [including . . 
. t]he corruption potential of the binding spurious class action intimidates 
me.  These cases are terribly easy to rig—a bright child could do it.  I 
would not hold out the bait.176 
Rule 23(b)(3) eventually passed muster because of a rule provision 
that allowed class members to opt-out of a (b)(3) class.177  While this 
opportunity for self-exclusion did not satisfy Frank,178 it gave sufficient 
comfort to other previously skeptical Committee members.179  Reporter 
Kaplan concluded that (b)(3) was an important step forward: 
This [Rule 23(b)(3)] in fact is a growing point in the law.  This is the 
situation that ought to be covered, left to some extent to the discretion of 
the court.  As we all know, cases involving large numbers of persons are 
                                                            
 175.   See Letter from B.K. (Benjamin Kaplan) and A.M.S. (Albert M. Sacks) (Jan. 31, 1964), 
supra note 141, at 6–7, 11(“With respect to the (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories, Mr. Frank is reluctantly 
willing to see the individual’s liberty somewhat limited, but he balks at (b)(3), which he views as a 
kind of luxury category that is not really necessary or important.”). 
 176.   Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank 
(May 28, 1965), supra note 142, at 2–3 (paragraph breaks omitted). 
 177.   Current Rule 23(c)(2)(B) states: 
For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to 
class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The 
notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language: . . . 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; 
 . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 178.   Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Dissenting View of Committee Member John P. Frank 
(May 28, 1965), supra note 142, at 4 (“That if the individual [in a (b)(3) class] knows of the action, he 
can ‘opt out’ by disclaimer gives me zero comfort.”). 
 179.   Frank describes how the opt-out resolved the (b)(3) problem: 
It was at that moment that committee member Judge Charles Wyzanski had his flash of 
genius.  He responded to Professor Moore, “Would you be satisfied, Professor Moore, if 
the class could never include anybody who specifically protests within a given period?”  
Professor Moore responded, “That would be helpful” and the principal opponent of  (b)(3) 
added, “If that were done, my problem would evaporate.” . . . [T]he rule was adopted . . . . 
John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, supra note 22, at 
269–70. 
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more and more almost the staple of federal litigation.  It is at this point 
that we make an advance.180 
In sum, the drafters of the modern class action rule were unwavering 
in their commitment to create a procedural mechanism for the enforcement 
of civil rights, as illustrated by their deliberations.181  Creation of the 
modern Rule 23’s civil rights provision went on to become a procedural 
force with which to be reckoned. 
III. MAJOR TRENDS IN RULE 23(B)(2) JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE LAST 
FIFTY YEARS 
A. The Heyday of Civil Rights Class Actions 
Modern Rule 23’s civil rights provision, coupled with the historic 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, empowered ordinary people to achieve 
extraordinary outcomes through the court system.  Fueled by public 
interest litigation and the growth of statutory rights and constitutional 
claims, federal courts certified civil rights cases impacting broad classes 
and providing far-reaching relief.182  Civil rights class actions were 
brought to challenge all manner of segregation and discrimination in areas 
such as education, housing, public accommodations, and employment.183 
Employment discrimination class actions under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 typified the law enforcement role of Rule 23(b)(2) in 
the 1960s and 1970s.184  Pursuant to this rule, the federal courts regularly 
certified cases enjoining broad discriminatory policies and individually 
                                                            
 180.   Transcript of Sessions on Class Actions–EE, supra note 29, at 25. 
 181.   In coming to a resolution over including (b)(2), the drafters also wrestled with the propriety 
of money damages being available under the provision.  Although the rule is silent on the issue, they 
concluded in the accompanying note that so long as money damages did not predominate, it was 
permissible.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“The 
subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or 
predominantly to money damages.”). 
 182.   See, e.g., Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action, supra note 28, at 639–40; Greenberg, 
supra note 39, at 585 (“In . . . prisoners’ rights, school desegregation, and employment 
discrimination—class actions have played a vital role.  They have made it possible to afford relief to 
large numbers of persons who, realistically, could not have been parties to litigation.”); see also id. at 
581 (describing broad remedies in school desegregation cases that typified the early 1970s).  
 183.   Greenberg, supra note 39, at 576 (discussing the “critical role” class action has played in 
civil rights litigation); 7AA WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 1776 nn. 6–9 (“Rule 23(b)(2) has been invoked 
in a wide range of civil rights contexts: suits arising out of alleged race and sex discrimination in 
employment; in school and housing desegregation or discrimination suits.”) (citing cases). 
 184.   See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 583 (“Class actions have played a major role in 
employment discrimination litigation.”); id. (surmising that “establishing the propriety of class relief 
had a high priority” for courts). 
360 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
compensating employees for back pay—because of its equitable nature.185  
Indeed, the first Title VII case heard by the Supreme Court in 1966 
affirmed the availability of class treatment to counter employment 
discrimination under the statute.186 
Moreover, during this time period, courts allowed “across-the-board” 
class actions—enabling named plaintiffs challenging one discriminatory 
practice to represent broadly other groups and to challenge other practices 
under the umbrella of a single class action.187  Some courts did not bother 
to determine if the Rule 23(b) criteria had been satisfied, concluding that 
aggregation was appropriate for cases enjoining segregation and 
discrimination.188 
Class actions also spearheaded a broader conception of civil litigation 
that resulted in expansive injunctive relief and systemic reform to major 
institutions such as prisons, foster care and public welfare.189  The 
traditional model of “bipolar litigation between two private parties, in 
which the remedy is retrospective and self-contained” had to give way to 
a model that joined multiple parties with public and private interests, in 
which the remedy was forward-looking and extensive.190 
Prison reform is illustrative.191  Efforts to reform “large, inefficient, 
abusive, unconstitutional prison systems” that had been stymied for 
decades were green-lighted through aggregate litigation.192  In 1968, for 
example, the Supreme Court held in Lee v. Washington that racial 
                                                            
 185.   Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads: An Answer to Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 391–96 (2011) [hereinafter Malveaux, Crossroads] (describing how 
back pay, as an equitable remedy, was regularly available in a (b)(2) class action). 
 186.   See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 583 (referring to Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147 (1982)). 
 187.   Marcus, History of the Modern Class Action, supra note 28, at 641–43. 
 188.   See 7AA WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 1776 & n.14 (citing cases). 
 189.   See id., § 1776 & n.10 (noting that “Rule 23(b)(2) has been invoked in a wide range of civil 
rights contexts: . . . in actions challenging public-welfare statutes or regulations as discriminatory” and 
citing cases); Edward F. Sherman, Introduction to the Symposium: Complex Litigation: Plagued by 
Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2004) (citing 
cases). 
 190.   Greenberg, supra note 39, at 576–77.  Jack Greenberg, citing the work of Professor Abram 
Chayes, describes the shift as follows: “Courts of equity have come to enter more broadly based 
decrees; the remedies have shifted from one-shot, one-way transfers to compensate for past wrongs, 
to decrees adjusting future behavior.”  Id. at 576 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1976)). 
 191.   Greenberg, supra note 39, at 577 (“Class actions have played a major role in securing the 
rights of prisoners.  Since the federal class action rule was revised in 1966, prisoner rights litigation 
has utilized the mechanism of class action to bring broad relief to inmates and detainees throughout 
the country.”). 
 192.   Id. at 576; see also id. at 577–78 (describing various rights advocated on behalf of prisoners 
in the class action context). 
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segregation of prisoners was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.193  
The injunctive and declaratory relief was not cabined to only the specific 
prisoners challenging segregation, but rather covered all prisoners in the 
Alabama penal system.194  Aggregation did what stare decisis could do, 
but with far less expenditure of judicial resources and lawsuits.195 
Aggregation also did what stare decisis failed to do.196  The Second 
Circuit’s holding in Marcera v. Chinlund197 illustrates this.198  Although 
the court had in at least three prior class actions determined pre-trial 
detainees’ rights to contact visits, the relief was cabined to those particular 
prisoners in those particular prisons.199  Marcera expanded the scope of 
relief to a class of prisoners state-wide, putting an end to piecemeal, 
seriatim enforcement and relief.200  Not surprisingly, the class action 
device became a popular tool for major prison reform where constitutional 
violations were clearly established.201 
In sum, the combination of Congress’s prolific creation of statutory 
rights coupled with the federal judiciary’s robust certification of systemic, 
injunctive civil rights cases resulted in a heyday of impactful civil rights 
litigation. 
B. Retraction of Civil Rights Aggregation and the Damages Conundrum 
This heyday would not last forever.  The perfect storm of statutory 
construction of rights and procedural access to aggregation in the courts 
started to calm in the late 1970s.202  The pendulum began to swing towards 
a more cabined approach as the Supreme Court reined in robust 
certification of civil rights cases.203 
                                                            
 193.   Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968). 
 194.   Greenberg, supra note 39, at 578. 
 195.   Id. 
 196.   See id. (“Stare decisis did not seem to be operating.”). 
 197.   Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1242 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, Lombard v. Marcera, 
442 U.S. 915 (1979). 
 198.   Greenberg, supra note 39, at 578.  
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More specifically, while recognizing that “suits alleging racial or 
ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving 
classwide wrongs,” the Court’s 1977 decision in East Texas Motor Freight 
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez cautioned that “careful attention to the 
requirements of [Rule 23] remains nonetheless indispensable.”204  In that 
vein, in 1982, the Court, in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. 
Falcon, rebuked the “across-the-board” approach in an employment 
discrimination case.205  That is, a victim of racial discrimination could no 
longer attack all unequal employment practices “across-the-board” that 
were subject to an employer’s policy.  Instead, the Court held that class 
representatives had to be members of the class they sought to represent 
and had to “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” of class 
members.206  In Falcon, the Court held that where an employee alleged 
that he had been denied a promotion on account of being Mexican-
American, he could not adequately represent a class of Mexican-American 
applicants who were not hired on account of similar discrimination.207  
Falcon marked a turning point; the Court made clear that a naked 
allegation of race discrimination in employment was no longer the sine 
qua non for class certification.208  Instead, certification of a Title VII 
employment discrimination case was contingent upon a “rigorous 
analysis” of the Rule 23 criteria.209 
Following Falcon, the number of employment discrimination class 
actions filed in federal court dropped precipitously.  For example, in 1976, 
1174 employment discrimination class actions were filed in federal 
court.210  By 1991, that number had dropped to thirty-two.211  Retreat of 
                                                            
 204.   E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).  In Rodriguez, the 
Court reversed class certification on the grounds that the named plaintiffs were inadequate 
representatives because they were not members of the class.  Id. at 403–04.  Mexican-American city 
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 205.   Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 
 206.   Id. at 156 (quoting Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403). 
 207.   Id. at 149, 158–59. 
 208.   Id. at 157; see also id. at 159 (“If one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment were 
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 210.   Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 
813, 820 (2004). 
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the public interest movement and growth of corporate political power led 
to fewer Title VII class actions being used as a conduit for social change. 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number of employment 
discrimination class actions increased slightly, leveling off at seventy-
three to eighty-five annually.212  This uptick was due, in part, to the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,213 which amended the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.214 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 responded to a number of 1989 Supreme 
Court cases viewed as hostile to civil rights enforcement.215  One of those 
was Martin v. Wilks,216 which dealt with the scope of relief a court could 
provide in a class action.  In this case, African-American firefighters 
brought a class action alleging employment discrimination in pay and 
promotions.217  The parties settled the case and the court issued a consent 
decree with an affirmative action plan that resulted in some White 
firefighters not being appointed.218  The latter contended that the decree 
discriminated against them and improperly bound them as non-parties in 
the prior case.219  The Supreme Court ruled in their favor.220  Congress—
in a rare show of overwhelming support221—overruled Wilks in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.222  In a nutshell, where the White firefighters had 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation in the 
prior class action, they could be bound to the class decree without being 
parties.223 
In addition to reversing a number of unfavorable civil rights rulings, 
the 1991 Act amended the 1964 Act to promote greater deterrence of 
                                                            
 212.   Id. 
 213.   42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012); see Greenberg, supra note 39, at 584 (noting in 1997 that 
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harassment and intentional discrimination.224  This course correction 
included providing compensatory and punitive damages and a right to a 
jury trial in employment cases alleging intentional discrimination.225 
Although designed to promote greater civil rights enforcement, the 
1991 Act had the unintended consequence of creating division among the 
federal circuit courts of appeals over the availability of monetary damages 
for Rule 23(b)(2) classes.226  Although all of the circuits that considered 
the issue concluded that monetary relief was permissible so long as it did 
not predominate over the injunctive and declaratory relief sought,227 the 
appellate courts used different tests when determining predominance.228  
This split made some circuits less amenable to certifying Title VII cases 
seeking monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2). 
The more rigorous certification approach was promoted by the Fifth 
Circuit in Allison v. Citgo, which conditioned certification on monetary 
damages being incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.229  
Damages had to “flow directly from liability to the class as a whole.”230  
Applying this stringent standard, the court concluded that the 
compensatory and punitive damages sought required individualized proof, 
and were therefore not incidental, and Rule 23(b)(2) certification was 
denied.231  The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits likewise adopted this 
approach.232 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit opted for a more flexible ad hoc 
balancing approach to the Fifth Circuit’s bright-line test.233  The Second 
Circuit’s Robinson v. Metro-North decision emphasized lower court 
discretion and determined whether the weight or value of the injunctive 
and declaratory relief predominated over the monetary damages from the 
                                                            
 224.   Hart, supra note 210, at 826. 
 225.   Id. at 813–14, 826. 
 226.   Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 49–50 (2011); 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1776, at 93–94; see 
also 7A WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 1784.1. 
 227.   See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 828. 
 228.   Id. at 830. 
 229.   Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 230.   Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)). 
 231.   Id. at 418.  This conclusion also meant that Rule 23(b)(3) certification was not appropriate 
because individualized questions predominated over common ones, in contravention of this rule’s 
requirements.  Id. at 420; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 232.   See Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l 
Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 233.   See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 
(2011). 
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plaintiffs’ eye.234  Other courts took a compromised position, choosing to 
allow hybrid certification.235  For example, a court might certify class-wide 
liability under Rule 23(b)(2) and individual monetary damages under Rule 
23(b)(3).236 
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the issue, adopting the 
incidental test, even where plaintiffs sought back pay under Rule 
23(b)(2).237  In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court concluded that since the back 
pay had to be determined on an individualized basis, rather than 
formulaically, the monetary relief was not incidental and Rule 23(b)(2) 
certification was not allowed.238 
This ruling has the effect of funneling much of employment 
discrimination class actions seeking monetary, in addition to injunctive, 
relief from 23(b)(2) to 23(b)(3) consideration239—a higher bar to clear.240  
Consequently, the civil rights class action rule born of the 1960s—i.e., 
(b)(2)—is less likely to be home to litigants seeking systemic change if 
they are also seeking monetary relief. 
In sum, following the civil rights movement, the next couple of 
decades were marked by the Supreme Court’s reining in aggregate 
litigation as a readily available procedural tool for addressing racial and 
other inequality on a wide scale.  Litigants could no longer sweep with as 
broad a brush over discriminatory practices and actors as before.  This 
retraction would continue into the next century, but with more attention 
than ever to the class action device. 
C. Contemporary Challenges to Combatting Systemic Discrimination in 
                                                            
 234.   Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 235.   Hart, supra note 210, at 829–30. 
 236.   Id. at 824. 
 237.   See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366 (2011).  The courts have historically 
recognized the importance of back pay as a prophylactic for employment discrimination and an 
incentive for voluntary compliance with Title VII.  Greenberg, supra note 39, at 584 (citing Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)). 
 238.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 362–63.  
 239.   See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Alexandra D. Lahav, Battered but Unbowed: A 2016 Update on 
Class Actions, in THE 20TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS D1, D-21 (A.B.A.  
2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/cle/2016/10/ce1610cac/ce1610caccor. 
authcheckdam.pdf. 
 240.   Suzette M. Malveaux, The Power and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class Action 
Landscape After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 659, 667, 671 (2013); Malveaux, A Diamond 
in the Rough, supra note 98, at 501–04 (describing Rule 23(b)(3) obstacles); see also, e.g., FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  The heightened notice requirement, for example, makes a Rule 23(b)(3) class 
potentially more expensive.  Moreover, the requirement that common questions predominate over 
individual ones and that a class action be superior to other procedural approaches also makes Rule 
23(b)(3) potentially more difficult to satisfy. 
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the Aggregate 
The twentieth century has ushered in a renewed interest in civil 
procedure and aggregate litigation with the swearing in of Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts, Jr.241  Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has 
grappled with an exceptional number of class actions.242 
There are several possible reasons for this.  The uptick in certiorari 
grants in the field may be explained by the fact that aggregation issues 
have had ample time to ripen into circuit splits and to reveal their 
importance to the long game.243  Significantly, the inordinate volume may 
be explained by a greater number of class actions in the federal pipeline 
due to the more recent discretionary availability of interlocutory review of 
certification orders under Rule 23(f),244 and enhanced federal jurisdiction 
over major class actions under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).245  
Some have attributed the growth to the composition of the Court itself, 
noting the Justices’ backgrounds in litigating federal cases and teaching 
civil procedure, their politics,246 and their capacity to effect procedural 
change relative to the rulemaking process and Congress.247 
This recent re-awakening of class action jurisprudence over the past 
ten years248 has had mixed results for litigants challenging systemic 
discrimination.  This section examines the Supreme Court’s use of 
worthiness as a screen for class certification,249 deference towards the 
enforceability of class action waivers, and policing of statutory, 
constitutional and evidentiary doorways to the civil litigation system.  
These broad areas provide a window into understanding how the Court’s 
contemporary jurisprudence impacts litigants’ ability to effectively 
challenge systemic discrimination using Rule 23(b)(2) today.250 
                                                            
 241.   Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 
313, 314 (2012). 
 242.   Id. at 314–15. 
 243.   See id. at 338–45. 
 244.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  Rule 23 was amended in 1998 to allow such discretionary 
interlocutory review.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendments. 
 245.   Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 246.   Wasserman, supra note 241, at 330–32. 
 247.   Id. at 333–34. 
 248.   Id. at 314–15. 
 249.   This article does not examine the Court’s treatment of the merits in cases involving other 
substantive areas of law, such as securities and antitrust. 
 250.   For example, issue certification and ascertainability are issues percolating in the courts 
below.  See Chad R. Fuller et al., A Serious Circuit Split on Class Ascertainability, LAW360 (June 30, 
2016, 4:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/813021/a-serious-circuit-split-on-class-
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1. Worthiness as a Screen: The Consideration of Merits at Class 
Certification 
The Court’s insistence that judges conduct a demanding analysis of 
the propriety of aggregation has clearly calcified.  Nowhere is that more 
apparent than in the Court’s treatment of the merits at the class 
certification stage.  Although judges are not permitted to condition 
certification on whether the putative class will ultimately prevail, they are 
free to consider the merits to the extent that they overlap with the 
certification criteria.251  This overlapping determination of the elements of 
a cause of action and the elements of Rule 23 has firmly taken root, putting 
to rest any doubt initially created by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.252  In 
1974, Eisen made clear that it was not appropriate to condition class 
certification on a case’s probability of success: 
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a 
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a 
suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. 
Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the Rule by allowing a 
representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without 
first satisfying the requirements for it.253 
Notwithstanding Eisen’s disallowing the aggregation determination to 
rise or fall on a case’s merits, a court may inquire into merits that overlap 
with certification criteria.254  The seminal case that confirmed this in the 
civil rights context is Wal-Mart v. Dukes.255 
In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs’ allegations of a pattern or practice of Title VII 
employment discrimination were interlaced with Rule 23’s requirement 
that the case involve common questions of law or fact.256  Like its 
predecessors, Wal-Mart reiterated the necessity for rigor and the movant’s 
burden of proof at the class certification stage.257 
But unlike prior case law, Wal-Mart conditioned its finding of 
“commonality” on plaintiffs’ having to put forth “‘[s]ignificant proof’ that 
                                                            
ascertainability. 
 251.   Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351–52 (2011); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
 252.   Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.  
 253.   Id. 
 254.   Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982). 
 255.   564 U.S. 338 (2011).  
 256.   Id. at 344–45.  In the interest of full disclosure, the author briefly represented the plaintiffs 
in the Wal-Mart case approximately fifteen years ago. 
 257.   Id. at 352–53. 
368 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
[the employer] ‘operated under a general policy of discrimination.’”258  
Arguably the easiest of Rule 23’s gatekeeper provisions, commonality 
became the blockade for 1.5 million women’s259 attempt to collectively 
challenge their employer for alleged nationwide gender discrimination.260 
To prevail in a pattern or practice case on the merits, plaintiffs must 
ultimately prove, inter alia, that a discriminatory policy (formal or 
informal) exists.261  Plaintiffs seeking class certification must now put 
forth “significant proof” that that predicate has been met, just to bond as a 
class.262  Thus, the criteria for commonality not only overlaps with the 
merits, but aligns more closely with plaintiffs’ likelihood of prevailing on 
the merits in a systemic discrimination claim.  In other words, worthiness 
becomes a screening device for collective access to the court in systemic 
discrimination cases.  This proves problematic where a court may rely on 
its own prejudgments and worldview when determining whether there is 
sufficient proof of a discriminatory policy’s existence.263 
This foreshadowing function is precisely what Eisen rejected.264  Class 
certification is not the juncture at which a judge should speculate about a 
case’s viability.265  Neither is it the vehicle through which a judge should 
impede a later determination on the merits.  Class certification and merits 
are like overlapping tectonic plates; a slight shift can have a major effect 
on the civil litigation landscape. 
Applying this higher commonality burden of proof, Wal-Mart 
decertified the case on the grounds that there was “not enough glue” to 
hold the case together as a class action.266  Not unlike the desegregation 
cases of the 1960’s—where school boards manufactured individualized 
                                                            
 258.   Id. at 353 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 159 n.15). 
 259.   Id. at 342. 
 260.   Id. at 357. 
 261.   See id. at 352–55. 
 262.   Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 263.  See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access 
to Justice, 93 B.U.L. REV. 441, 445 (2013) (describing how Wal-Mart’s heightened commonality 
standard stemmed in part from “[c]laimant animus, combined with hostility toward and a 
misunderstanding of claims of discrimination”); see also Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough, supra 
note 98, at 492–99 (describing the Wal-Mart majority’s incredulity that a majority of male mangers 
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 264.   See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
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Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 586 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011)) (“Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-
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but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for 
class certification are satisfied.”). 
 266.   Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352. 
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pupil assignment factors like geography, bus transportation routes, age,  
and student aptitude to deflect a court away from the real determinant 
“race”—Wal-Mart did the same regarding gender in the employment 
context.267  Highlighting the fact that pay and promotion decisions were 
made by different supervisors, in different stores, at different times, for 
different jobs, etc.—the employer was able to deflect attention away from 
the real and systemic determinant “gender.” 
How has Wal-Mart’s heightened commonality impacted other civil 
rights cases?  What ripple effect has resulted and what are the implications 
of even this small wave?  For every action, there is an equal and opposite 
reaction.  This has certainly been the case regarding the pragmatic 
response to Wal-Mart’s heightened commonality standard.  A half-dozen 
years post-Wal-Mart, litigants and judges have shaped the parameters of 
the case’s reach.  It has certainly become more difficult for litigants to 
challenge highly discretionary discriminatory conduct on a class-wide 
basis post-Wal-Mart.268  However, recognizing the Court’s reticence to 
certify a class of over 1.5 million class members nationwide, other litigants 
have sought certification of cases of far less enormity and breadth.269  
Putative classes are now more narrowly defined, geographically limited, 
and divided into subclasses.270  Plaintiffs have turned to state courts as a 
potentially more receptive venue for granting class certification.271 
An excellent example of recalibration post-Wal-Mart is the robust 
development of jurisprudence regarding issue certification.272  When 
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 270.   See Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-
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 271.  Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough, supra note 98, at 499, 499 n.268 (citing Kumar v. Gate 
Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014)). 
 272.  See Challenging Limited Issue Class Actions, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.foley.com/challenging-limited-issue-class-actions-04-27-2017/ (discussing “growing 
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possible, litigants are seeking to certify a particular issue273 rather than an 
entire claim, 274 and some courts are granting this tapered request.  As civil 
rights claimants move from Rule 23(b)(2) to (b)(3), discussed supra, they 
must meet the latter’s strictures of proving that common issues 
predominate over individual ones for class certification.275  Litigants, 
however, are also able per Rule 23(c)(4) to seek certification of a single 
issue where appropriate.  Thus, specific issues related to liability have been 
cordoned off and subjected to class treatment, over objections that this 
undermines Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions 
predominate over individual ones. 
Courts and commentators are divided276 over whether a judge must 
consider a plaintiff’s entire claim when determining whether common 
issues predominate over individual ones under (b)(3), and then apply (c)(4) 
to certify a particular issue; or whether a judge may extract a particular 
issue per (c)(4), and then consider predominance per (b)(3).  The Second, 
Third, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have supported the latter 
approach, albeit using different methods.277  The Fifth Circuit has taken 
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of issue certification); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (issue 
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economy”); Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 272 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting approach from 
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Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving issue 
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that would make issue certification easier. 
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the former approach,278 but retreated somewhat,279 leading some to 
conclude that there is more consensus on the matter.280 
Given the judicial economy and efficiency that aggregate litigation 
offers, it’s no wonder that many federal court judges are trending toward 
permitting some limited aggregation in the (b)(3) context.  To the extent 
that systemic discrimination cases are housed here, issue certification 
should remain. 
Moreover, issue certification should be available for Rule 23(b)(2) 
classes.281  Injunctive civil rights cases often have discrete issues—such as 
the existence and impact of a particular policy—that warrant certification 
on efficacy grounds.282 
In addition to constricting the edges of the litigation form, litigants and 
judges have conceptually cabined Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes by 
distinguishing it from similar cases.  In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs contended that 
the employer gave its local managers unfettered discretion when making 
salary and promotion decisions, to the detriment of its female 
employees.283  Plaintiffs alleged that this excessive subjectivity was the 
vehicle for nationwide gender discrimination by a workforce managed 
largely by men in a culture that promoted unchecked gender 
stereotyping.284  In this environment, male supervisors at stores all over 
the country allegedly exercised their discretion in a discriminatory 
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 282.   See id.; Letter from Leslie A. Brueckner, Senior Att’y Public Justice, to Rule 23 Subcomm. 
of the Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 6 (Sept. 8, 2015), 
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 283.   Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344–45 (2011). 
 284.   See id. 
372 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
manner, although perhaps subconsciously, while the company’s 
leadership intentionally looked away.285  Plaintiffs offered workforce 
statistics, individual affidavits and social science data as significant proof 
that the employer operated under a general policy of discrimination—i.e., 
imbuing local supervisors with excessive discretion when making 
personnel decisions that adversely affected women’s employment 
opportunities.286  Plaintiffs alleged, effectively, that it was the wild, wild, 
west. 
But for the Court, the company’s lack of a policy being the 
discriminatory policy was a bridge too far.287  This was especially true 
where the company also had, at least on paper, a formal, written anti-
discrimination policy.288  Where such a written policy existed, the Court 
was incredulous that a majority of supervisors would exercise their 
discretion in a way that harms the employment opportunities of women.289  
Given the recent onslaught of sexual harassment employment 
discrimination claims industry-wide in Hollywood and elsewhere, this 
incredulity seems even less justified. 
The Court inexplicably paid undue homage to a relatively standard 
corporate practice—i.e., a company providing boilerplate language that 
formally forbids discrimination—in the Court’s assessment of whether 
there was significant proof of a discriminatory policy.  Certainly, 
subjective decision-making that permits implicit bias to go unchecked may 
co-exist with a formal discrimination prohibition. 
In any event, not surprisingly, in other cases where putative class 
members allege the same type of policy of excessive subjectivity as a 
vehicle for discrimination as in Wal-Mart, they have suffered a similar 
fate.290  Their cases have not been certified—inside and outside the Title 
VII context. 
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 286.   Id. at 346. 
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Other courts, however, have distinguished Wal-Mart, despite the fact 
that the litigants identified discretionary practices as potentially harmful 
to group rights.  For example, in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner) overturned the 
denial of class certification where local branch and regional managers 
exercised their discretion pursuant to explicit companywide national 
teaming and account distribution policies.291  Alternatively, in Scott v. 
Family Dollar Stores, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the denial 
of class certification where the upper-level managers of the company 
themselves exercised the challenged discretion.292  In these cases, 
commonality was satisfied despite plaintiffs’ allegations that discretionary 
practices were discriminatory and far-reaching. 
The distinction between these cases and Wal-Mart can be explained 
by how close the nexus is between the allegedly discriminatory decision-
makers and corporate policy.  In McReynolds, although those who made 
the adverse discretionary decisions were local, low-level managers, their 
actions were tightly connected to centralized, nationwide policies created 
at the corporate level.293  In Scott, those who made the adverse 
discretionary decisions were high-level managers, who exercised such 
centralized power and control that their actions were equivalent to 
corporate policy.294 
In Wal-Mart, the employer deliberately chose to decentralize power295 
and to widely disburse it among its supervisory personnel who were 
allegedly left unchecked and prone to potential bias (implicit or explicit) 
in making personnel decisions.296  Conceptually, there seems little 
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local variability as uniformity”); Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 815–16 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(relying on Wal-Mart, and concluding that commonality was not satisfied in case brought by African-
American employees alleging race discrimination under Title VII because they did not “demonstrate 
that the employer had a policy of allowing discretion by lower-level supervisors over employment 
matters” and “that all supervisors ‘exercise[d] their discretion in a common way”); see also Ellis v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 980–85, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (relying on Wal-Mart, vacating 
and remanding the lower court’s decision to certify a class of current and former employees for failure 
to meet the commonality and typicality standards). 
 291.   McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489, 492. 
 292.   Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 114, 119 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 293.   McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490. 
 294.   Scott, 733 F.3d at 114. 
 295.   For purposes of this article, the author does not weigh in on whether the record supports this 
conclusion.  Taking as true, arguendo, the Court’s conclusion that power was decentralized at Wal-
Mart, this was a policy choice the corporation made that does not warrant different certification 
treatment.  
 296.   This, of course, is contextual.  Whether personnel are prone to bias may be, in part, 
374 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
justification for treating one employer’s policy choice differently than 
another, for purposes of class certification. 
Granted, supervisors in the field untethered from corporate oversight 
could lead to rogue actors and behaviors.  This would certainly be relevant 
to whether there was a pattern or practice of discrimination.  But equally 
relevant would be whether a company intentionally crafted a personnel 
scheme with minimal corporate participation and oversight, and 
knowingly turned a blind eye to the consequential discriminatory practices 
of its subordinates.  Also relevant is the extent to which such employment 
decisions operated in an environment that allegedly institutionalized 
gender inequality and power inequities. 
While Wal-Mart has not sounded the death knell for employment 
discrimination and civil rights class actions—including those alleging 
discretionary behavior—the ruling has front-loaded and elevated the 
merits inquiry at the class certification stage.  The expense and time 
involved in merits discovery for all parties at the class certification stage 
warrant concern.  The hidden cost of front-loading such discovery may 
deter potentially meritorious cases from being brought.  Indeed, fewer 
employment discrimination class actions, for example, have already been 
filed post-Wal-Mart.297 
2. Contractual Rights Over Civil Rights: The Enforcement of Class 
Arbitration Bans 
Given the seminal role of aggregate litigation in eradicating systemic 
discrimination, one of the most troubling trends of modern civil litigation 
is the privatization of the justice system.298  This is because for dispute 
resolution systems outside of the public domain—such as pre-dispute 
compulsory arbitration—there are often less procedural protections for 
workers, consumers and every-day litigants.299  Examples of such waived 
protections include the right to a jury trial, subsidized forum, transparent 
process, written record, robust discovery, binding legal precedent and 
significant appellate review.300  Remedies may be proscribed, precedent 
                                                            
environmentally based.  In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs argued that the risk of bias was significant because of 
the corporate culture.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). 
 297.   See Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 270, at 804, 804 n.5. 
 298.   See generally Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”?  How Coke’s One-Way Binding 
Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 77 (2009) 
[hereinafter Malveaux, Is It the Real Thing?]. 
 299.  Id. at 80–81, 83–85. 
 300.  Id. at 84. 
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jettisoned and arbitrators’ neutrality compromised.301 
Having said that, arbitration may offer advantages that the court 
system does not.  It may include lower costs, greater speed, more 
flexibility in process and remedy, enhanced privacy and a decision-maker 
with superior subject-matter expertise.302 
Given the considerable distinctions between private arbitration and the 
public litigation system, one would expect the presence of significant 
safeguards to ensure that parties knowingly consent to one forum over 
another.  To the contrary, many individuals with little or no bargaining 
power are compelled to forego their “day in court” because they 
unknowingly signed an arbitration clause appearing in fine print, buried in 
a contract, written in incomprehensible legalese.303  The bulwarks of 
freedom of contract—such as a meeting of the minds and consent—
quickly break down in this environment, thereby undermining familiar 
justifications for the enforcement of such arbitration agreements. 
Over the last several decades,304 and more acutely under the Roberts 
Court, the Supreme Court has trended toward enforcement of private 
arbitration agreements.305  This deference has resulted in a proliferation of 
arbitration agreements in all manner of contract, including employment.306  
Emboldened by this jurisprudence, by 2007, employers had contracted 
with twenty percent of the workforce to waive court access for workplace 
disputes.307  A recent study indicates that “since the early 2000s, the share 
of workers subject to mandatory arbitration has more than doubled and 
now exceeds 55 percent.”308 
                                                            
 301.  Id. at 84–85. 
 302.  Id. at 84.  However, there are occasions when arbitration is more expensive than litigation 
given the hourly cost of an arbitrator and various fees. 
 303.  Id. at 85. 
 304.  See id. at 80–83 (describing prevalence and evolution of pre-dispute compulsory arbitration 
agreements). 
 305.   The latest example of this is Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark, in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that FAA was violated where state rule held that 
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because waiver of court access and jury trial was conditioned 
upon express provision in power-of-attorney. 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2017). 
 306.  See Malveaux, Is It the Real Thing?, supra note 298, at 83. 
 307.   A 2007 study found that approximately one out of five employees are subject to arbitration.  
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and 
Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) (“Although there are limitations to the existing 
studies, they do show a consistent pattern of significant expansion of employment . . . a current 
estimate in the range of 15 to 25 percent of employers having adopted employment arbitration seems 
reasonable.”). 
 308.  ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION; ACCESS TO 
THE COURT IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION AMERICAN WORKERS, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
1 (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf.  The study also found that more than half of 
nonunion private-sector employers have mandatory arbitration.  Id. at 1–2.  This number goes over 
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Not only is significant employment in the United States conditioned 
on waiver of court access, employment is increasingly conditioned on 
waiver of collective action.  Fueled by favorable jurisprudence, a growing 
number of businesses are inserting class action bans in arbitration 
agreements embedded in their employment contracts.309  For example, 
from 2012 to 2015, class arbitration bans increased from 16.1% to 
39.2%.310  A recent study found that, of employees subjected to mandatory 
arbitration, over 41% have signed a class action waiver.311  This results in 
over 23% of private-sector nonunion employees—24.7 million American 
workers—not permitted to bring a class action for employment claims.312  
Consequently, employees seeking to challenge discriminatory personnel 
practices through negative value suits are foreclosed from doing so outside 
the class action paradigm. 
The Court’s key rulings have enabled this trend.313  For example, in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court upheld the enforceability of 
a class arbitration ban despite California’s judicial rule that certain bans 
were unconscionable.314  The Court concluded that California’s law was 
inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and pre-empted by 
the Act.315  California could not condition the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement on the availability of a class action.316  Concepcion 
established this prohibition despite the American Arbitration 
Association’s history of successful class arbitrations, the admitted 
importance of aggregation to small dollar claims, and the application of 
California’s class action ban to arbitration and litigation alike.317 
Similarly, in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court 
upheld an arbitration agreement that foreclosed aggregation but went even 
                                                            
65% for companies larger than 1,000 employees.  Id.  For private-sector non-union employees, over 
56% are subject to mandatory arbitration.  Id. at 2.  Consequently, the study concludes that for the 
overall workforce, over 60 million American workers are subject to arbitration.  Id. at 5.  
 309.   See id. at 1–2. 
 310.  Julianna Thomas McCabe, SCOTUS to Determine Enforceability of Class Action Waivers in 
Employment Contract Arbitration Clauses, CLASSIFIED: THE CLASS ACTION BLOG (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://classifiedclassaction.com/scotus-determine-enforceability-class-action-waivers-employ 
ment-contract-arbitration-clauses/. 
 311.  Colvin, supra note 307, at 2.  
 312.   Id.   
 313.   Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 314.   563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011). 
 315.   Id. at 352. 
 316.   Id. at 344. 
 317.   The Supreme Court again held that California law was pre-empted by the FAA because the 
state court allegedly interpreted arbitration agreements with class actions bans less favorably than 
other contracts.  See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).  
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farther.318  In this antitrust case, the Court concluded that even if a 
proposed class of merchant plaintiffs proves that it is economically 
impossible to individually pursue their cases in arbitration, an arbitration 
agreement that forbids them from seeking a class action is enforceable 
under the FAA.319  Pursuant to the agreement’s terms, a party is compelled 
to pursue its claim individually—regardless of whether individual 
arbitration is impossible or irrational to pursue.320  In this case, the cost of 
an expert analysis necessary to prove the merchants’ claims far exceeded 
each individual’s potential recovery (some by ten times).321  Thus, in the 
absence of any cost-sharing with the defendant, aggregation was the only 
viable way to challenge defendant’s business practices.322 
The Court has articulated a commitment to arbitration subject to the 
forum’s being an effective vehicle for rights vindication.323  The effective 
vindication rule, however, has been significantly eroded by American 
Express.  The Court’s prioritization of the existence of rights in theory 
over practice324 allows arbitration to be used as a shield for corporate 
malfeasance and accountability.  This misappropriation delegitimizes the 
significant value of this litigation alternative and unfortunately risks 
equating the forum with abusive practices and partiality. 
The Court has the opportunity to rein in this misappropriation in Epic 
Systems Corp. v. Lewis.325  The Court recently granted review to determine 
whether an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee that 
waives Rule 23 class actions and FLSA collective proceedings for labor-
related claims is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 
notwithstanding the National Labor Relations Act’s protection of an 
employee’s right to engage in “concerted activities.” 
In this case, employee Jacob Lewis sued his employer, Epic Systems 
Corp., in federal court on behalf of himself and other technical writers, 
alleging that Epic violated the FLSA and Wisconsin law by misclassifying 
                                                            
 318.   See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309. 
 319.   Id.  
 320.   See id. 
 321.   Id. at 2308. 
 322.  See id. 
 323.   The Court has stated on numerous occasions that arbitration is permissible “so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum . . . .”  
Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
(1985)). 
 324.   Id. at 2309. 
 325.  See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 
(2017).  The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in the case.  Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: 
An Epic Day for Employers in Arbitration Case?, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 2, 2017, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argument-analysis-epic-day-employers-arbitration-case/. 
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them and unlawfully denying them overtime pay. 326  Epic moved to 
dismiss the complaint and compel individual arbitration pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement prohibiting class and collective actions in the 
adhesion employment contract. 
The courts below concluded that the class arbitration waiver violated 
the NLRA’s Section 7, which gives employees the right to “engage in . . . 
concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection,” and 
Section 8, which enables them to enforce that right.327  Moreover, the 
Seventh Circuit held the arbitration agreement unenforceable under the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s “savings clause” because the agreement violated 
“generally applicable contract defenses.”328  More specifically, the 
arbitration agreement is allegedly unenforceable under the FAA because 
it violates the NLRA.329 
The propriety of class action bans in employment arbitration 
agreements has come to a head, with the circuit courts split on the issue.330  
This is the question the Supreme Court seeks to resolve. 
At risk is that arbitration agreements will effectively become 
exculpatory clauses.  Workers will be compelled to forgo their rights in 
exchange for employment through boilerplate adhesion contracts that 
disallow class arbitration and make individual arbitration cost-prohibitive.  
Thus, workers who have discrimination and fair wage claims that arise in 
the course of their employment may not be able to effectively challenge 
systemic misconduct, especially where their claims and wages are small.  
This capture of the arbitral forum does harm to the procedural vehicle itself 
and does a disservice to those individuals seeking to use the civil rights 
provision of the modern class action rule as intended.331  The outcome will 
be less enforcement in the cases where it is needed the most.  And given 
the likelihood that the enforcement gap cannot be effectively filled by 
relevant government agencies, the rule of law is endangered. 
                                                            
 326.  See id. at 1151. 
 327.  Id. at 1155 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)). 
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3. Statutory, Constitutional and Evidentiary Gateway Issues to 
Collective Litigation 
The recent direction of aggregation jurisprudence has proven more 
nuanced as parties on both sides jockey to define how wide the door should 
be for access to representative litigation.  The parameters of the federal 
procedural rules, the Constitution, and evidentiary proof are the latest 
battleground upon which plaintiffs and defendants vie for influence.  The 
Court’s response has been mixed. 
a. Gamesmanship 
Two recent opinions by former Civil Procedure Professor, now 
Supreme Court Justice, Ginsburg illustrate the Court’s intolerance for 
perceived gamesmanship on both sides.  On the one hand, the Court has 
rejected defendants’ manufacturing mootness of putative class actions by 
paying off named plaintiffs’ individual claims.  On the other hand, the 
Court has rejected plaintiffs’ circumventing the discretionary interlocutory 
appellate process for certification denials by voluntarily dismissing their 
individual cases.  The Court’s rulings have identified the envelope’s edge 
as both the defense and plaintiffs’ bar attempt strategies that promote the 
interests of their client base. 
Plaintiffs may take some solace in the Court’s treatment of defendants’ 
offers of judgment and settlement made to named plaintiffs to moot 
putative class actions.  The impact of such offers on the viability of 
potential aggregation has evolved in plaintiffs’ favor. 
Initially, in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the Court held that 
a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) became 
moot when, before moving for conditional class certification and before 
any plaintiffs opted-in, the named plaintiff received an offer of judgment 
under Rule 68 that would fully resolve all of her claims.332  Where the sole 
named plaintiff received an offer—which was unaccepted—that mooted 
her FLSA claim, the collective action was also mooted.333  Thus, an 
employer at risk of significant class-wide liability could strategically avoid 
such potential exposure by offering the individual class representative 
complete relief upfront. 
However, in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the Court later 
                                                            
 332.   569 U.S. 66, 69–71, 78–79 (2013). 
 333.   See id. at 78.  The Supreme Court did not decide whether a Rule 68 offer of judgment could 
moot an individual case, but rather presumed this.  Id.  
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disallowed a company to defeat class certification by making a complete 
Rule 68 offer of judgment or settlement offer—which was unaccepted—
to the individual putative class representative.334  Gomez adopted the 
rationale of Justice Kagan’s dissent in Symczyk, noting that as most first-
year law students are taught, an unaccepted offer has no legal 
consequence.335  This plaintiff victory, however, may be tempered by what 
the Court did not decide: “We need not, and do not, now decide whether 
the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the 
plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the 
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”336 
This open question foreshadows mootness issues to come, as 
evidenced already in the courts below.337  At this juncture, however, those 
seeking to challenge systemic discrimination under the refuge of the 
modern class action rule need not fear that this defense tactic will diminish 
the scope of their case. 
Alternatively, defendants may take some solace in the Court’s 
treatment of plaintiffs’ use of voluntary dismissals to immediately 
challenge certification denials.  In Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, owners of 
Microsoft’s Xbox 360 videogame console filed a putative class action 
alleging a design defect.338  The district court struck plaintiffs’ class 
allegations from the complaint, resulting in plaintiffs’ seeking the Ninth 
Circuit’s permission to immediately appeal the certification denial 
pursuant to Rule 23(f).339  When the appellate court exercised its discretion 
in plaintiffs’ disfavor, they voluntarily dismissed their individual claims 
with prejudice, but reserved the right to resurrect them if the appellate 
court reversed the lower court’s certification denial.340 
Armed with what they thought was a final decision, the plaintiffs 
appealed only the Ninth Circuit’s decision to strike their class 
allegations.341  The Ninth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291—which empowers the appellate court to review only 
“final decisions of the district courts”—and reversed the lower court’s 
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decision to strike the class claims.342 
Upon Microsoft’s challenge to the appellate court’s jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit lacked § 1291 jurisdiction 
because plaintiffs’ voluntary-dismissal decision was not a final decision, 
but rather a tactic to circumvent Rule 23(f)’s discretionary interlocutory 
review of certification denials.343  The Court rejected this tactic not only 
because it appeared to be a work-around discretionary review—and thus a 
rebuke of the courts’ roles in relation to each other and the rulemaking 
process344—but that it also unfairly favored plaintiffs over defendants.345  
As in Gomez, Justice Ginsburg rejected what she perceived as “one-sided” 
gamesmanship too close to the line.  Consequently, those defending 
themselves from allegations of class-wide discrimination need not fear 
that certification denials can be immediately appealed solely at the 
plaintiffs’ discretion.346  In sum, for plaintiffs and defendants alike, the 
current Court is not only in the business of safeguarding legal boundaries, 
but also of policing aggregate litigation strategies when they flout more 
prudential lines. 
b. Standing 
Another issue for those seeking to redress systemic discrimination via 
aggregation is the extent to which the Court may cabin or broaden the 
standing doctrine for named plaintiffs and putative class members.  
Standing has increasingly become a gateway issue for class actions, with 
both plaintiff and defense counsel poised to do battle and declare 
victory.347 
On the defense side, litigants contend that there has been a 
proliferation of class actions filed by named plaintiffs who are uninjured 
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382 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
and therefore ineligible to bring systemic statutory cases for want of 
Article III standing.  The argument goes that even where there is a 
violation of the underlying statute, this is insufficient to confer standing if 
there has not been a concomitant injury-in-fact.  To allow otherwise would 
give Congress the power to expand court jurisdiction beyond the 
Constitution’s limitations.  Moreover, the defense contends that a 
proliferation of such class actions will unjustly enrich plaintiffs’ counsel 
and clog the court system with frivolous litigation.348 
On the plaintiff side, litigants argue against a heightened standing 
requirement.  They contend that when entities willfully violate someone’s 
statutory rights, this should be sufficient to confer him standing.349  Where 
Congress has created a private right of action to enforce a statutory 
provision, it follows that a violation of that provision satisfies the injury-
in-fact prerequisite.  Otherwise, plaintiffs would not have access to the 
courts to enforce a host of federal statutes, including anti-discrimination 
ones.350 
With the courts divided on this standing doctrine,351 the Supreme 
Court has forayed into the area with mixed results.  Its initial attempt in 
First American Financial Corporation v. Edwards was lack luster, 
resulting in the conclusion that the case had been improvidently granted.352  
The Court’s more recent attempt, Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, while ultimately 
remanding the question of standing to the lower court, has established a 
more nuanced approach than either party embraced.353 
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In Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, the Court was tasked with determining in a 
putative class action whether the named plaintiff Robins had Article III 
standing to sue website operator Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA) for willfully publishing inaccurate information about him.354  
Despite Robins’s contention that the false information impaired his ability 
to get a job, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.355  In particular, the district court held that Robins had alleged 
only a statutory violation, and not an injury-in-fact, thus depriving him of 
constitutional standing.356  The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the 
alleged statutory violation was sufficient for Article III standing.357 
The Supreme Court—in a much-awaited opinion—ultimately did not 
resolve the thorny question over the extent to which Congress has the 
power to determine what constitutes an injury sufficient to confer Article 
III standing.  In a six-to-two opinion authored by Justice Alito,358 the Court 
concluded that in order to have constitutional standing, Robins needed to 
have suffered an “injury-in-fact,” which meant that the injury was both 
“concrete and particularized.”359  The case was remanded because the 
Ninth Circuit had failed to do this.360  The Court made clear, however, that 
a “concrete” injury was not “necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible’” and 
that “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”361  In fact, a “risk 
of real harm” may satisfy “concreteness.”  Congress has the power to 
elevate an intangible harm to a concrete injury, but a “bare procedural 
violation” is not enough to confer Article III standing.362  Although the 
dissent concluded that Robins had already alleged an actual injury, the 
majority did not—leaving this for the Ninth Circuit below.363 
Spokeo permits named plaintiffs to collectively pursue claims under 
federal statutes—including civil rights—when they suffer intangible 
harms, so long as those harms are concrete.  The fact that such harms are 
sufficient to confer constitutional standing advantages plaintiffs.364  That 
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advantage is tempered, however, by whether plaintiffs will be able to 
successfully prove that their claims go beyond mere technical statutory 
violations. 
Moreover, whether absent class members should each have to suffer 
an injury-in-fact, thereby giving them standing, is hotly contested.  There 
is significant apprehension over the existence of “no-injury classes,”365 out 
of concern, inter alia, that such classes are bloated with non-injured 
individuals who will take from those with legitimate claims.  This concern, 
however, should not matter for the traditional (b)(2) civil rights injunctive 
class action because of its focus on group harm and group remedy.  There 
is no individuation, thereby making an injury-in-fact prerequisite for each 
absent class member purposeless. 
This cannot be said for the (b)(3) class.  Here, requiring standing to 
encompass not only a federal statutory violation, but also actual injuries, 
makes Rule 23(b)(3) class certification potentially less likely.  Plaintiffs 
run the risk that individualized injury-in-fact determinations will 
predominate over the common question of a statutory violation, making 
(b)(3) certification impossible.366  Erecting this certification barrier may 
limit corporate exposure and deter plaintiffs from bringing aggregate 
litigation in all manner of cases involving federal statutory rights.367  As 
civil rights litigants pursuing monetary and injunctive relief post-Wal-
Mart are shunted from the traditional (b)(2) to (b)(3) class, the parameters 
of the latter become more salient. 
Although it is premature to predict the impact of Spokeo, on balance, 
the Court’s standing doctrine is more nimble and nuanced than expected.  
The contours of the standing doctrine are still very much being shaped, 
giving lower courts the opportunity to craft jurisprudence consistent with 
promoting court-access, law enforcement and Congressional restraint. 
Similarly, Article III’s case or controversy requirement is potentially 
another issue with far-reaching implications for the future of civil rights 
aggregate litigation.  This justiciability requirement may be an entry point 
for courts’ tamping down the extent to which named plaintiffs may 
represent class interests when their own individual claims have been 
                                                            
Review), IMPACT FUND (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.impactfund.org/legal-practitioner-
blog/scotus16-classactions. 
 365.   See, e.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] class should 
not be certified if it is apparent that it contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at 
the hands of the defendant[.]” (citations omitted)).  
 366.  See Cooper, supra note 347 (explaining that the question of whether a case may be certified 
as a class action where its absent class members are uninjured was not decided by Tyson Foods Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), as anticipated.). 
 367.  Lewis, supra note 350. 
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extinguished. 
The Court’s recent Microsoft decision is instructive.  This instruction 
comes in large part from what the Court did not decide.  Tellingly, the 
majority opinion of five justices368 skirted the second question that was 
granted certiorari review: i.e., whether the federal appellate courts have 
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution to review a class 
certification denial after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their 
claims with prejudice.369  Relying on § 1291’s statutory jurisdictional 
grounds, the majority never reached the constitutional standing question 
squarely addressed by the concurrence.370 
By contrast, Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion adopted the 
judgment, but on constitutional grounds.371  More specifically, he 
concluded that the named plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice 
constituted a final judgment,372 but that the Ninth Circuit still lacked 
jurisdiction because there was no “case” or “controversy” required by 
Article III.373  Plaintiffs’ voluntary extinguishment of all of their individual 
claims left them “no longer adverse” to Microsoft “on any claims.”374  The 
concurrence narrowly defines the case-or-controversy justiciability 
requirement in the class action context: 
Class allegations, without an underlying individual claim, do not give 
rise to a “case” or “controversy.”  Those allegations are simply the means 
of invoking a procedural mechanism that enables a plaintiff to litigate his 
individual claims on behalf of a class.  Thus, because the Court of 
Appeals lacked Article III jurisdiction to adjudicate the individual 
claims, it could not hear the plaintiffs’ appeal of the order striking their 
class allegations.375 
This narrow justiciability interpretation—adopted by only three 
Justices376—bodes unwell for putative classes.  Decoupling individual 
named plaintiffs from the putative class for case-or-controversy purposes 
would neuter the latter whenever the former’s claims are resolved.  This 
                                                            
 368.   Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) (Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion, 
which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan). 
 369.   Id. at 1712. 
 370.   Id.  
 371.   Id. at 1716 (Thomas, J., concurring).  This was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito. Id. at 1715 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 372.   Id. at 1716 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 373.   Id. at 1717 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 374.   Id.  (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 375.   Id. at 1718 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 376.   They are Justice Thomas, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts.  Justice Gorsuch did not 
participate in the consideration or decision of the case.   
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outcome seems unjustified given the Court’s prior recognition that even a 
named plaintiff whose own individual claim is mooted may appeal a denial 
of class certification order.377  Not only the Court’s precedent, but also its 
acknowledgement of the class action’s separate role, warrants a broader 
justiciability stance.378 
In sum, the Court’s interpretation of constitutional gateway issues—
such as standing, mootness and the existence of a case-or-controversy—
foreshadows the types of challenges and feats those contesting systemic 
discrimination can expect going forward.  The extent to which a named 
plaintiff has sufficient skin in the game to promote class interests is a 
continued debate that will have significant ramifications for civil rights 
enforcement. 
c. Ascertainability 
Another significant issue in aggregation jurisprudence is how rigorous 
courts should be in requiring litigants to be able to ascertain class 
membership as a condition of certification.  The Circuit Courts of Appeals 
are divided not so much over the propriety of this implicit threshold 
itself—which is found nowhere in the class action rule—but over whether 
the threshold should be exacting or not.  On the one hand, the Third 
Circuit,379 joined by the First,380 Fourth381 and Eleventh382 Circuits have 
adopted a heightened ascertainability standard which requires that: 1) the 
class be “defined with reference to objective criteria” and 2) there is a 
“reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining 
whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”383  On the 
                                                            
 377.   See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980).  This point was argued in 
Brief of Complex Litigation Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16–17, 
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) (No. 15-457) (“The Geraghty Court concluded that 
the named party could appeal the denial of class certification despite his mooted claims because ‘[t]he 
proposed representative retains a “personal stake” in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure 
that Art. III values are not undermined.’” (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404)). 
 378.   See Brief of Complex Litigation Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 377, at 24–25, of which I was a signatory; see also Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and 
Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 611–21 (2014). 
 379.   See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 
F.3d 300, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–94 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 380.   In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 381.   EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 382.   Karhu v. Vital Pharms. Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 383.   See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (quoting Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355).  See also Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
593 (“If class members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or 
‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is inappropriate.”). 
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other hand, the Seventh, joined by the Second, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits have rejected the second “administrative feasibility” prong.384 
Competing rationales are behind the dueling approaches.  Those 
supporting heightened ascertainability rely on a number of arguments set 
forth by the leading Third Circuit case, Carrera.385  First, the approach 
eliminates administrative burdens—such as mini-trials—just to identify 
class members, which supports the efficiency goal of aggregate 
litigation.386  Second, rigorous ascertainability ensures proper notice to the 
class.387  Third, the heightened approach screens out illegitimate claimants 
whose participation dilutes recovery for legitimate claimants.388  Finally, 
the rigorous bar is necessary to protect defendants’ due process rights to 
raise individual defenses and challenge individual class membership.389 
Those supporting ascertainability-lite, including most recently the 
Ninth Circuit, have countered each of the above rationales.390  First, an 
administrative feasibility requirement is not necessary given the class 
action rule’s own manageability requirement, which effectively promotes 
efficiency.391  By contrast, there is nothing in the rule’s text requiring 
administrative feasibility.  To import this new standard runs counter to the 
Court’s admonition against such impermissible rulemaking.  Second, a 
heightened ascertainability requirement is not necessary for notice because 
the rule requires only the “best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances,” rather than actual notice.392  Third, given the low response 
rate to class settlements, the concern over fraudulent submissions is not 
                                                            
 384.   Mullins v. Direct Dig. LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2015).  The Second Circuit 
more recently clarified that it did not adopt the heightened ascertainability requirement.  In re Petrobras 
Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017) (“With all due respect to our colleagues on the Third Circuit, 
we decline to adopt a heightened ascertainability theory that requires a showing of administrative 
feasibility at the class certification stage.”). See also Briseno v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 
1123 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6249 (Oct. 10, 2017); Sandusky Wellness Ctr. 
LLC v. Medtox Sci. Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2016);See also Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 
799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016). 
 385.   See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–08 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 386.   Id. at 305.  
 387.   Id. at 305–06.  
 388.   Id. at 310. 
 389.   Id. at 307. 
 390.   See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1123–33 (9th Cir. 2017); Robert G. 
Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the Debates Over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 913, 928–40 (2017) [hereinafter Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits] (making 
arguments against rationales given for strict ascertainability and noting that “[a] class can exist without 
anyone knowing precisely who is and who is not a member”). 
 391.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 933–
35. 
 392.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 930–
31. 
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significant.393  Finally, a defendant’s due process rights are not implicated 
by the ascertainability threshold because the defendant can still raise 
individual affirmative defenses and challenges to the named plaintiffs 
immediately and to the absent class members later.394  Not surprisingly, 
the rigorous ascertainability hurdle is favored by the defense—especially 
for low-dollar claims—and the lite one favored by plaintiffs.395 
While there is a “growing consensus” among the federal circuits in 
favor of ascertainability-lite,396 and some disagreement over just how split 
the circuit courts are,397 there remains at least a clear demarcation in 
approach between the Third Circuit and others, which would countenance 
Supreme Court intervention.398  The Court, however, has declined review 
in Mullins v. Direct Digital LLC,399 Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,400 and 
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.401 
The duel between heightened and lite ascertainability, however, is one 
largely appropriate in the context of class actions certified pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(3).402  Granted, as civil rights cases seeking monetary relief in 
addition to injunctive relief get shunted from Rule 23(b)(2) to (b)(3) post-
Wal-Mart, this ascertainability threshold battle will increasingly matter.  
However, civil rights class actions seeking primarily injunctive relief—in 
which 23(b)(2) certification is appropriate—should as a normative matter 
be immune from any heightened ascertainability requirement given their 
fundamental history and role. 
Conditioning certification on the ascertainability of class members 
should not apply to Rule 23(b)(2) classes because it is immaterial whether 
individual class members can be identified.403  The 1966 drafters made 
                                                            
 393.   See also Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 935–37 (discussing 
distribution of class recovery). 
 394.   See id. at 937–39. 
 395.   See Amanda R. Lawrence, The Great Class Action Ascertainability Debate, LAW360 (Aug. 
14, 2017 12:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/953496/the-great-class-action-
ascertainability-debate; Chad R. Fuller et al., A Serious Circuit Split on Class Ascertainability, 
LAW360 (June 30, 2016 4:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/813021/a-serious-circuit-split-
on-class-ascertainability. 
 396.   See In re Pertrobas Secs., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 397.   See Alison Frankel, SCOTUS Case Will Test Justice Gorsuch’s Appetite for Class Action 
Limits, REUTERS (May 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/otc-gorsuch-idUSKBN18424X. 
 398.   See id. 
 399.   795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
 400.   799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016).  
 401.   844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6249 (Oct. 10, 2017). 
 402.   Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 957 (“[E]ven the strongest 
advocates of strict ascertainability refuse to apply it to (b)(2) class actions.”). 
 403.   See Larkin Letter, supra note 281, at 3; see, e.g., Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530, 
542 (6th Cir. 2016); Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 557–59, 561, 563 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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clear that (b)(2) applies “in the civil-rights field where a party is charged 
with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose 
members are incapable of specific enumeration.”404  The goal of the civil 
rights class action provision is to provide a group remedy for group harm.  
The very nature of the harm is group-directed.405  The very nature of the 
remedy is indivisible, thereby making it unimportant for each individual 
class member to be ascertained.  Each class member, by virtue of group 
membership, will be the beneficiary of the injunctive and/or declaratory 
relief. 
Moreover, from a pragmatic vantage, heightened ascertainability for 
(b)(2) classes is unwarranted because class members are not entitled to 
notice or an opportunity to opt out of the collective litigation.406  Unlike 
(b)(3), there is no practical need to identify and inform individual class 
members of the litigation so that they can participate personally or 
withdraw altogether.407 
The majority of federal appellate courts recognizes these distinctive 
features of the civil rights injunctive class and consequently do not hold it 
to a heightened ascertainability standard.  Four circuits—including the 
most taxing Third Circuit408—have explicitly ruled that ascertainability for 
(b)(2) classes is unnecessary.409  Despite such favorable jurisprudence for 
civil rights litigants challenging systemic discrimination, the direction of 
this gateway jurisprudence is unclear.  Should the Court ultimately weigh 
in on the propriety of a more rigorous ascertainability requirement, the 
Court should recall the rulemakers’ goal to protect and enhance collective 
actions against discrimination. 
d. Aggregate Proof 
Finally, a critical key to class action litigation is to what extent 
aggregate proof may be used for certification and class-wide liability.  In 
Wal-Mart, Justice Scalia rejected the plaintiffs’ proposal to replace 
                                                            
 404.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.  The Advisory 
Committee explained: “Action or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning of this subdivision 
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 406.   Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 930–31. 
 407.   Cole, 839 F.3d at 541. 
 408.   Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits, supra note 390, at 929 (citing Shelton, 775 F.3d at 
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to apply it to class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2).”). 
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individualized back pay determinations following a pattern or practice 
finding with a sampling method, condemning it as “Trial By Formula.”410  
The Court concluded that plaintiffs’ “novel project” would violate the 
employer’s right to raise individual defenses under Title VII.411  Thus, it 
logically followed that such individualized back pay determinations were 
not “incidental” to the injunctive relief sought, making (b)(2) certification 
unjustified.412  In Comcast Inc. v. Behrend,413 the Supreme Court denied 
class certification in an antitrust case where plaintiffs’ regression model 
failed to demonstrate that damages were susceptible to class-wide proof.414  
Because of such failure, individual questions predominated over the 
common ones, making Rule 23(b)(3) certification inappropriate.415  
Following Wal-Mart and Comcast, the notion that class certification is 
unjustified where monetary relief has to be calculated on an individualized 
basis has gained traction. 
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, a six-to-two decision by Justice 
Kennedy, however, has more recently tempered this impression.416  Tyson 
Foods allowed aggregate proof or sampling, to prove class-wide liability 
in a class action, despite Wal-Mart’s language forbidding “Trial By 
Formula.”417  In Tyson Foods, representative proof was permitted where 
the underlying substantive law—the Fair Labor Standards Act—allowed 
it.418  In particular, the Court permitted the use of a study reporting the 
average amount of time it took for an employee to don and doff his 
clothing at defendant’s plant, especially where the employer failed to keep 
records.419  Tyson Foods also rejected the contention that a class cannot be 
certified if it requires individual damages calculations under Rule 
23(b)(3)—contrary to how some have interpreted Comcast.420  
Individualized damages are permissible, so long as they do not 
predominate under Rule 23(b)(3).  While Tyson Foods cleared the way for 
                                                            
 410.   564 U.S. 338, 366–67 (2011). 
 411.   Id. at 367. 
 412.   Id. 
 413.   569 U.S. 27 (2013). 
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a representative or statistical sample to be used in establishing class-wide 
liability, Justice Kennedy’s ruling was narrow: its use “will depend on the 
purpose for the sample is being introduced and on the underlying cause of 
action.”421  Again, the Court’s latest word on the matter has left no clear 
victors. 
In sum, the renewed jurisprudential interest in the modern aggregation 
rule has led to mixed results for litigants trying to use the class action to 
contest systemic discrimination.  On the one hand, named plaintiffs have 
successfully staved off dismissal because of unaccepted offers of 
judgment or settlement.  They may still challenge certain discretionary 
practices as discriminatory, forum shop, and structure the parameters of 
litigation such that certification is more likely.  They continue to represent 
others, even when their own claims are resolved, and to use aggregate 
proof when defendants do not keep records. 
On the other hand, litigants alleging discrimination have a far more 
formidable evidentiary task of proving commonality in systemic 
discrimination cases.  For cases mirroring Wal-Mart’s theory of liability, 
decentralized decision-making and size, this task is all but impossible.  
Moreover, plaintiffs are largely foreclosed from seeking monetary relief 
under the class action rule’s civil rights provision, resulting in greater cost 
and risk to successfully aggregate their claims.  Named plaintiffs are no 
longer able to immediately challenge a class certification denial by 
voluntarily dismissing their claims with prejudice or to represent a class 
without having an actual injury.  Meanwhile, the Court’s robust procedural 
docket continues to grow—with the addition of a new Justice as well422—
leaving the landscape yet still subject to contour.423 
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF MODERN CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE 
Now more than ever, there is a pressing need for the civil litigation 
system to function properly as the rule of law is increasingly under siege.  
The current assault on the Constitutional and civil rights of persons based 
on race, religion, gender, immigration status and more threatens the very 
fabric of American society.  Greater violence, hate crimes, discrimination 
and divisive policies will undoubtedly lead to greater litigation, and 
already have.424  The country is at a painful juncture in American history, 
where its values of equality and justice in a pluralistic society, are arguably 
tested on the daily. 
This crisis point is a good time to recollect the values emanating the 
modern class action rule’s civil rights provision, and recommit to honoring 
the drafters’ intent.  Five decades ago, the rule drafters found themselves 
in a similar chaos, where tectonic societal shifts challenged them to design 
procedures that would enable “parties to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”425  The 
modern class action rule’s civil rights provision was one answer to that 
societal turmoil and a concrete embodiment of how historically 
marginalized people could seek justice and efficiency in the federal courts.  
This very same rule remains today and continues to play a critical role in 
American democracy.426 
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    In addition to the class action, court-ordered injunctions that apply to non-parties nationwide 
have gained traction as a means of creating systemic change under both the Obama and Trump 
administrations.  See generally, Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National 
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).  Whether a national injunction is an appropriate alternative 
to representative litigation is an important issue, which I am grateful to Professor Howard Wasserman 
for raising.  While the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, this timely discussion is starting.  
Compare Bray, supra, at 4, 60 (arguing for a prohibition of national injunctions and offering the class 
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This is not to say that this procedural vehicle is flawless or free from 
abuse.  There are a number of ways in which the rule may be improved, as 
recognized by recent proposals of the Rule 23 Subcommittee to the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and related comments, testimony and 
input provided by the bar, bench and legal academy nationwide.427  
Tellingly, however, is that the Advisory Committee ultimately chose not 
to change Rule 23’s civil rights class action provision.428  The text of the 
modern class action rule—the fulcrum upon which all federal cases 
balance—does not necessitate or explain the higher hurdle for civil rights 
class certification.  Rather, it is judicial interpretation of the rule’s 
scriptures that has resulted in the rule’s diminished utility.429 
Despite the pendulum’s swing from a heyday of civil rights class 
actions to a more measured one, class actions are still being brought to 
enforce all manner of civil rights today.  For example, a half dozen Black 
men and women, Black Lives Matter Chicago, and a number of 
community organizations recently filed a (b)(2) class action complaint 
seeking federal court oversight of Chicago City’s Police Department, 
alleging various unconstitutional racially discriminatory policies and 
practices against thousands of individuals, primarily Black and Latinx.430  
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 428.   The proposed amendments ultimately disseminated by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
do not address Rule 23(b)(2)’s treatment of monetary relief or Rule 23(a)’s heightened evidentiary 
burden for commonality out of deference to the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart.  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 423 with PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra 
note 427, at 218–32. 
 429.   As discussed, this pendulum continues to swing, and has not yet rested on a clear landing 
place. 
 430.   See Class Action Complaint at 2–7, 114–20, 127–131, Campbell v. City of Chicago, No. 
1:16-CV-04467, 2017 WL 2587483 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2017); Press Release, MacArthur Justice 
Center, Landmark Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against the City of Chicago Alleging Racially 
Discriminatory Policing and Violent Police Abuse (June 14, 2017), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
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Another example of a recent (b)(2) class action is one brought by a male 
and female Army veteran on behalf of hundreds of thousands of veterans 
since 9/11 who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and developed post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury during their 
service and were allegedly released with less-than-Honorable discharges 
in violation of the Constitution and Administrative Procedure Act.431 
In addition to the traditional civil rights injunctive class actions 
pursued under (b)(2), cases seeking monetary relief for similar alleged 
violations of federal law are also being pursued under (b)(3).  For example, 
in a case brought on behalf of veterans disabled in combat, the National 
Veterans Legal Services Program brought a (b)(3) class action against the 
federal government, alleging that its policy improperly capped retroactive 
disability payments owed to six years, thereby depriving thousands of 
veterans their proper benefits.432  Most recently, three female employees 
filed a class action against Google, alleging that it systematically 
discriminated against women in hiring, pay and promotions, in violation 
of various local labor laws. 433  Plaintiffs seek wages due, damages, and 
injunctive relief, and pursue certification under a California law similar to 
(b)(3).434  Of course, some contemporary class actions have been brought 
under both (b)(2) and (b)(3).  For example, a class action was filed on 
behalf of impoverished members of the Ferguson, Missouri community 
against the City for its policy of allegedly using its municipal court and 
jail to collect fees and fines as a revenue source for the City, functionally 
operating a debtor’s prison system in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause.435 
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 433.   Class Action Complaint at 1–3, 6–7, Ellis v. Google, Inc., No. CGC-17-561299, 2017 WL 
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 434.   Id. 
 435.   Class Action Complaint at 1–5, Fant et al. v. City of Ferguson, No. 4L15-CV-00253-AGF, 
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Preservation of the civil rights class action is even more critical today 
in light of the new administration’s retraction of systemic pattern or 
practice cases by executive agencies tasked with enforcement of anti-
discrimination statutes.436  The private bar will need to fill the void left by 
such retraction.437  There is ample evidence that marginalized people and 
their advocates are up for the task.  Betty Dukes, the named plaintiff in 
Wal-Mart, is a perfect example of someone with the grit and perseverance 
that characterizes many who challenge widespread systemic 
discrimination on behalf of others.  Although Ms. Dukes recently passed 
away, her spirit lives on in others that carry the torch against injustice.  At 
a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on access to justice issues, and in 
response to Senator Patrick Leahy’s question about whether she would 
give up after her loss in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wal-Mart, Ms. 
Dukes said no, “The best is yet to come.”438  Indeed, the future direction 
of collective action, as suggested by some of the Supreme Court’s recent 
class action jurisprudence, may be on the rise.439 
V. CONCLUSION 
At this point, the pendulum has swung away from the heyday of class-
wide injunctions against systemic discrimination towards a more complex 
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web of conditions.  The modern class action rule’s civil rights provision 
was admittedly born in a simpler time.  Fifty years after the modern rule’s 
birth, there has been great expansion in substantive rights and remedies, 
societal diversity, technological advances and globalization.  Although 
explicit bigotry and hatred still exist—and have found renewed expression 
as of late—the Jim Crow signs delineating separate facilities for Blacks 
and Whites and numerous facially discriminatory policies have become 
relics of the past.  In their place, institutional racism and structural barriers, 
on the one hand, and implicit bias of individuals,440 on the other hand,441 
account for much of the driving force behind group disparities. 
Although the specific targets of anti-discrimination litigation may 
look different, at their core is systemic subordination that Rule 23(b)(2) 
was designed to address.442  The Rule’s goal of enabling broad injunctive 
and declaratory relief appropriate to the class as a whole when 
countenanced is as salient today as it was a half century ago.  
Contemporary class action jurisprudence should recommit itself to 
allowing the procedural rules to function as the drafters intended and 
enable American values like equality and justice to prevail.  Too much is 
at stake on this golden anniversary. 
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